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

EVANGELISM–ALLY OF PARK CHUNG HEE

IMPERIALIST AIMS IN SPAIN AND KOREA



THE DEFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE ROK

KOREA FOCUS

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An Editorial Comment

The Agricultural Revolution in the DPRK

By GEORGE B. MURPHY, JR.

Nothing defines more concretely and with greater clarity the peaceful aims of the government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), than a recent official report revealing the dramatic gains made by the working people of this socialist Asian country in closing the economic, social and cultural gap between town and countryside while raising the living standards and the spiritual well being of the people as a whole.

The report was made by Deputy Kim Il, premier of the republic's Administration Council, to the fifth Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang, the nation's capital, last November, and published in the English language edition of the *Pyongyang Times*.

The report is titled "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country and the Future Tasks."

The "Theses" refers to the technological, ideological and cultural aspects of the "Revolutionary Rural Construction Program," enunciated by President Kim Il Sung in 1964, which provided, for the first time in the history of the country, "An all-round, scientific solution to the rural question."

This is how President Kim summarized the goals of this revolutionary program: "We intend to do away with the distinctions between heavy and light labor and between agricultural and industrial labor, free women from the heavy burdens of household chores and, further, get rid of the distinction between physical and mental labor."

It is important to keep in mind that this program was inaugurated just ten years after the Korean war (1950-1953) when U.S. imperialism, utilizing bacteriological weapons, unleashed its savage, genocidal war against the heroic people of Korea, laying waste the land and splitting the country in half.

Here are some excerpts from the report which indicate the tremendous strides made in agricultural production despite the problems of bad weather and the continued harassment by the puppet fascist regime of South Korea, backed up by some forty-thousand American troops kept there by the government of the United States:

- "This year (1974) we have achieved a brilliant victory by producing over seven million tons of grain, thus hitting two years ahead of the time set, the grain goal of the six-year plan (1970-1976) set at the Fifth Congress of our party."
- "In 1973 our total yield of grain grew to 136 percent compared with the previous year, and this year it again increased by 31 percent over last year."
- "Our average per chong bo* rice yield this year was as high as 5.9 tons on a nation-wide scale, and especially an average of 6.8 tons of rice per chong bo was reaped on a provincial scale in South Pyongyang Province. As a result, our country has risen to the world's highest standard in per-unit area yield of rice."

With respect to other aspects of agricultural production, the report gives these interesting figures: vegetables, nearly two times greater than 1964 and 1.2 times greater than 1973; meat, 2.5 percent greater than 1963. Chicken and duck output increased by 4.3 times over 1963 while egg production increased 7.4 times.

The report notes that with the increased agricultural production has come a rapid improvement in the living standards of the farmers, including a rise in amount of cereals and grain per family unit, in addition to cash income which "will increase 2.7 fold compared with 1963."

Kim Il in his report states that the "theses" has clarified the essential content of the rural question under socialism. These theses—the

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* A CHONGBO equals 2.45 acres.

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technological, cultural and ideological revolutions—are now in full swing throughout the contryside.

With respect to the technological revolution, the report points out that the theses made clear that this is "not a mere technical affair to develop the productive forces, but a socio-political affair to emancipate the farmers from difficult and labor-consuming work." In this connection, the report states, that the theses "refined irrigation, mechanization, electrification and chemicalization as the four basic tasks, the four component parts of the rural technical revolution."

The report highlights some important technological developments that have improved the working lives of farm families in the rural areas of the country. A highly developed irrigation system has been completed that insures "rich and stable harvests" under all types of bad weather conditions, including drought and floods.

Mechanization of farms is proceeding apace with the development of a large tractor industry which makes it possible "to bring the number of tractors in the countryside up to 70,000 to 80,000 (in terms of horse-power units)." There is now a tractor for every unit of "cultivated land in plain areas and three in the intermediary and mountainous areas." A large number of cooperative farms have now been mechanized.

Tremendous strides have been made in rural electrification, according to the report, which notes with satisfaction that "As a result of the thorough implementation of the Partys electrification policy the task of the theses for supplying all the farm villages and every farm house with electricity in a few years, was carried to completion by the end of 1969."

Annual consumption of electricity in the country has now reached 1,600 million kwh, which the report states, places the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea far ahead of the advanced countries of the world in the field of rural electrification."

Chemicalization in agriculture has also made significant advances. Of this the report says: "More scrupulous soil investigation was conducted on a nation-wide scale in our country and a scientifically-substantiated system of fertilization has been firmly established for each plot of land from the plain areas even to a small tract of land in the mountainous regions."

This rapid development and completion of the targets set for industrializing and modernizing agricultureal production through irrigation, mechanization, and chemicalization based upon "firm material and technological foundations," has meant that during the past ten years a new, creative life has opened up for the farm families in rural areas.

This change expresses itself in the cultural revolution now in full force, through rapid development of education at all levels, publishing newspapers, magazines, books, wider use of television, new housing, increasing the social services for women, mothers of children, and increasing and modernizing transportation facilities.

From the following facts and figures, the report gives a vivid picture of a steadily rising standard of living, cultural advances and general well being of the farm families, all of which defines the steady progress of closing the gap between town and countryside:

- Modern bus transportation is now available to eighty-five percent of the total rural population.
- Guaranteed maternity leave for working women is now a reality.
- More than 43,000 nurseries and kindergartens have been built thus freeing working mothers from many burdensome household chores.
- During the past ten years more than 560,000 modern housing units have been built in the rural areas of the country.
- With the rapid advancement of adult education programs, farmers are now receiving higher education for the first time, in science, technology and general knowledge. Special Working People's schools of higher education have graduated more than 680,000 workers during the past ten years. Of this number, more than 399,000 have come from rural farming areas.
- Agricultural colleges, staffed by highly trained teachers, have been built in the rural areas. Teams of technicians and specialists, averaging twenty-four members, now serve all of the cooperative farms in the country.
- Increased publication of books, magazines

and newspapers plus the steady increase in TV services, is producing a new type of farm family whose members read daily papers regularly and are beginning, for the first time in their lives, to satisfy their rising thirst for knowledge through books.

- Completion of the program for building polyclinics and new or rehabilitated hospitals has meant that today, for the first time in their lives, all farm families enjoy free medical care.

The report stresses the fact that intensive "class education and education in socialist patriotism," has produced a new type of class-conscious farmer with an anti-imperialist world outlook, reflecting "a new, radical change in their ideological consciousness, in their spiritual and moral traits."

This report does more than tell us of the splendid progress the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) are making in building for themselves and their children a new society, a socialist society that conforms to their high standards for realizing a better life.

The report defines the peaceful terms of reference within which this progressive development is taking place. Thus, it speaks clearly and in the friendliest spirit to all progressive Americans, to join with them in support of the peace initiatives they have made to the Congress of the United States a year ago calling upon our government to withdraw American troops from South Korea, in order to permit the Korean people themselves to unite the entire country, under mutually beneficial conditions that promote peace and reconciliation.

An Editorial Comment

The Tyranny of the Minority

By PROFESSOR FRED J. CARRIER

The currently recessed 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly marked an historic turn of events. The tyranny of the minority—that is, three decades during which the Western imperialist powers led by the U.S. and their economic dependencies dominated the Assembly—has been signalled at an end. A great majority of the people of the world, embracing the socialist countries and many of the former colonial areas of the Third World, have joined forces to demand the end of imperialism.

In its first decades the United Nations was a convenient vehicle through which the U.S. could provide international sanction for its policies. There were only 51 original member states, compared to the current 138, and most of Africa and Asia were without voting power. More than 650 million Chinese comprising the People's Republic were denied representation in the United Nations for 22 years. Thanks to wholesale disfranchisement of the world's people, the U.S. dominated the proceedings of the Assembly, counting on Latin American economic dependencies and a dozen NATO allies to provide the votes for the U.S. on any given issue.

It was during this heyday of American influence that the United Nations endorsed U.S. cold war policy of keeping Korea divided. A separate South Korea dependent on the U.S. offered a military base to "contain" the spread of socialism in Asia. In 1948 the United Nations sanctioned a partition of Korea, arranging an election in South Korea which established the Syngman Rhee dictatorship. In 1950 the United Nations authorized a military force to fight the Korean War (1950-1953). In reality this United Nations Command proved to be largely U.S. forces which together with the South Korean army were placed under U.S. command. (See *Korea Focus*, Vol. 1, No. 1—1971 "The U.N. Role in the U.S. War.")

A quarter of a century after authorization of such a force, and 22 years after the signing of an armistice in Korea, a U.S. force of 38,000 soldiers still remains in South Korea under the guise of a United Nations action. But the world has changed in this quarter century. The Socialist world has grown stronger and national

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liberation struggles have seized upon the opportunity thus opened. Vietnam was a defeat for the U.S. forcing it to accept *Detente* offered by the Socialist world. It is time for the U.S. to extend Detente to Korea.

The attempt to end U.S. occupation of Korea was made in the Assembly during this session. A resolution sponsored by 40 countries called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops under United Nations auspices in South Korea (all foreign troops are from the USA). When the resolution was voted upon the result was a 48-48 tie, with 38 abstentions. While this result was somewhat disappointing to friends of the Korean people, it was not a defeat but a delay. Only a year ago, in the 28th Session, the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were present for the first time and the Korean question was broached. At that session the chief accomplishment was dissolution of the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, a recognition that Korea's future was for the Korean people to decide. This year's vote was an even clearer recognition that the principle obstacle to Korean unity is the presence of a foreign army in the south which denies Koreans their self-determination.

What promises the eventual independence of the Korean people, hopefully in the near future, is the way in which the world is moving. Events in the Assembly indicate very clearly that the direction is toward national independence in the fullest political and economic sense —a direction opposite from imperialism and colonialism. Perhaps the most significant event was the adoption by the United Nations of a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" which affirms the right of nations to control their own resources and the equality of trade among all states. While the Charter is a statement of principles, it is reflective of the political-economic changes which have strengthened the socialist world and encouraged the national liberation forces in the Third World.

Undoubtedly the most dramatic expression of this revolutionary course was the Assembly vote according to the Palestine Liberation Organization the right to participate in the debate over Palestine and to Yasir Arafat the honors of a head of state. By an overwhelming 89-8 vote, with 37 abstentions, the Assembly also acknowledged the right of Palestinian Arabs to their homeland which in turn requires Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. All the socialist world and all the Arab states, as well as most other Third World countries, supported this stand.

Other actions which made this session "historic, perhaps revolutionary," as the president of the Assembly Abdelaziz Bouteflika characterized it, were the admission of Guinea-Bissau as a sequel to a long revolutionary struggle culminating with the overthrow of fascist dictatorship in Portugal; condemnation of the military dictatorship of Chile; and suspension of South Africa from the Assembly for failing to end its control over Namibia (formerly the colony of Southwest Africa).

It was the total atmosphere of these decisions, constituting an attack on the remnants of the colonial structure, which prompted an outrageous foray by the head of the U.S. delegation John Scali. Attacking what he termed the "tyranny of the majority," Scali came up with a new kind of imperialist logic whereby a minority can be in reality "a practical majority." He said:

"The minority which is so often offended may in fact be a *practical majority* in terms of its capacity to support the organization and implement its decisions. Paper triumphs are, in the end, expensive even for victors."

The Scali attempt at intimidation was coupled with an echo of gunboat diplomacy outside the Assembly as Kissinger threatened that the U.S. would resort to military means to preserve its right to petroleum in Arab lands. Imperialism is far from dead! Its power to stop the liberation process is on the wane, though this does not preclude desperate attempts.

For the future of the Korean people, whose land is divided and occupied, the revolutionary tide in the world, reflected in the United Nations, omens well. Against the 30 years of U.S. occupation, Korea can weigh its thousands of years of national endurance. Surrounded as Korea is by larger countries with distinct civilizations, how else could Korea have survived except through the strength of its own national consciousness? Another year of foreign intervention, though it be unjust, cannot hold back the tide of national liberation.

Evangelism — Ally of Park Chung Hee

By JONATHAN MARSHALL

Marx may have exaggerated when he charged that "religion is the opiate of the people," but his words have long had a ring of truth for Asia. From the days when Christian missionaries were sent to China and Korea to open up new markets for American manufacturers, to the more recent efforts of the American CIA to finance anti-communist religious minority groups in Southeast Asia, the West has consistently used religion as a spearhead of cultural and economic penetration in the Orient.

Since World War II, America's politico-religous programs have been chiefly aimed at stirring up anti-communist sentiment around the world to promote the containment or roll-back of leftist regimes. Thus the CIA has at various times backed everything from Asian Buddhist monks to reactionary Russian orthodox churches catering to Eastern European emigres, to Pope Paul's Italian anti-communist youth movements.[1] Most anti-communist religious fronts, however, are supported by wealthy right-wing individuals or foreign governments, but all have similar ends.

Many of these "religous" groups are now affiliated with worldwide anti-communist organizations, especially the Asian Peoples' Anti-Comm nist League (formed by Chiang Kai-shek and Korean President Syngman Rhee in 1954) and its umbrella organization, the World Anti-Communist League. These two groups, although confined largely to propaganda activities (APACL's role in the 1954, CIA-organized Vietnam refugee resettlement is one of several exceptions), help coordinate the activities of the world's leading anti-communists and of regional organizations such as the irredentist Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, the European Freedom Council, and the Free Pacific Association. Also associated with APACL is the International Committee for the Defense of Christian Culture headed by an ex-Foreign Minister under Spain's Franco, and composed of former German Abwehr agents, Ukrainian Catholic activists, professional American anti-semites, John Birch Society spokesmen, and a former advisor to Syngman Rhee, James Cromwell. Other religious groups represented in APACL/WACL conventions include the Christian Anti-Communist Association (South Korean), and the Asian Christian Anti-Communist Association. All are dedicated to winning the hearts and minds of the world's many non-Christians and turning them away from the lure of communism.[2]

South Korea has long been a center of anti-communist Christian agitation in Asia because of its large Christian population (one out of eight South Koreans is Christian, and the number is rising rapidly) and because of the highly favorable political climate offered first by Syngman Rhee and now by General Park, who have subsidized right-wing Christian groups and promoted a "Christianizing" campaign in the military. Evangelists who consider the Third World to be of great "strategic significance" point out that South Korea now boasts over 8,500 seminary and Bible school students. And South Korea has another advantage for Christian activists—a convenient enemy. During Billy Graham's famous Crusade to South Korea in mid-1973, which drew over two million people (thanks to some official pressure), chants like "Fifty million for Christ" were instigated to agitate for a roll back of Communism and unification of the Korean Peninsula's fifty million inhabitants. Thus it was fitting that Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was the home of the first All-Asian Mission Consultation, a meeting of Asian missionaries to plan the evangelization of Asia's 98 percent non-Christians.[3]

One American evangelical organization has

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Christian Anti-Communist Crusade

The Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, although affiliated with APACL, specializes in rooting Communists out of Latin America. Headed by "the amazing Aussie Communist-hunter" Fred Schwartz, CACC is based in southern California at Long Beach, where it draws financial support from right-wingers as Walter Knott (Knott's Berry Farm) and Patrick J. Frawley (Schick Eversharp). Its $350,000 annual income supports many activities, including a Latin American literature project.

Back in 1961, Schwartz's Crusade worked with the U.S. Information Agency (and the CIA) to defeat Marxist candidate Cheddi Jagan in British Guyana's presidential election. Schwartz admitted spending $76,000 to influence the election in favor of the right-wing United Force party. The Crusade's money allegedly helped finance anti-Jagan street gangs and rioters to discredit his government. Shortly thereafter the CIA began a major campaign to undermine Jagan by infiltrating Guyana's powerful black labor unions with the help of the CIA-funded American Institute for Free Labor Development.

Though no one has ever proven any connection between Schwartz and the U.S. government, his activities closely parallel those of the CIA. U.S. embassy officials have never questioned his work. If he is not a CIA man, he ought to be.

(Sources: William Turner, *Power on the Right*, (Berkeley: Ramparts Press, 1971); Jane Kramer, "Letter From Guyana," *New Yorker* (September 16, 1974), pp. 100-128; Cheddi Jagan, *The West on Trial* (London, 1966), p. 307).

been quick to exploit the opportunities provided by South Korea: Campus Crusade for Christ International. Founded by ex-California businessman William R. Bright in 1951, Campus Crusade is headquartered in a multimillion dollar luxury hotel located on a 1,735 acre estate at Arrowhead Springs, near San Bernardino. With a full-time staff of over 3,000 people in fifty countries and an annual budget over $15 million, Bright's organization is dedicated to sparking off a "spiritual explosion across America and around the world" which will Christianize the world in the next decade.[4]

Campus Crusade experienced a remarkable growth in the past five years through the use of sophisticated computerized marketing techniques and an almost embarrassingly oversimplified set of theological principles. It has, however, met with some opposition from established Christian organizations thanks to its conservative fundamentalist principles and resistance to social change. Campus Crusade speakers typically cite the "great red dragon" of Revelation 12 to warn of the threat of Chinese Communism, and the group's film, "Berkeley—A New Kind of Revolution" portrays Martin Luther King and the peace movement, tinted red, as examples of what is wrong with America. The evangelist organ *Christianity Today reports* that at EXPLO '72, a student congress on evangelism sponsored by Campus Crusade in Dallas (featuring Billy Graham), "The Peoples' Christian Coalition, an anti-war group . . . kept Crusade officials hopping to head off leafletting and pintsized demonstrations. Two dozen Coalition members and Mennonites one night in the Cotton Bowl held up a large banner reading 'Cross or flag, God or country?' and chanted 'Stop the war' but were promptly shushed by the crowd." Indeed, the atmosphere of Campus Crusade's EXPLO '72 seemed best described by the popular chant, "Two bits, four bits, six bits, a dollar. All who're for Jesus, stand up and holler!"[5]

Even as EXPLO '72 was ending, Bill Bright began planning Campus Crusade's next and even more ambitious venture—EXPLO '74 in South Korea. Slated to cost $1.5 million, EXPLO '74 was planned for an attendance conservatively estimated at 300,000, well over three times the draw of its 1972 predecessor. Campus Crusade got a big boost when Billy Graham plugged his friend's project during his 1973 expedition to Seoul. Campus Crusade's high-rise headquarters in central Seoul (on land donated by the government after a battle

American priest, the Rev. James P. Sinnott, of Brooklyn, N.Y. being arrested and manhandled by Seoul police. He was charged with "instigating" street demonstrations.

in 1968 to remove squatters) was mobilized to prepare for the event. And Campus Crusade's chief representative in Seoul, Joon Gon Kim, drawing upon the organization's experience in fighting communism in Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand, as well as the strong encouragement of his government, directed the entire project.[6]

Bright suffered a temporary set-back last year when the Korean National Council of Churches officially expressed its "lack of concern" about the evangelical crusade, according to the *Washington Post,* for "fear it would be used as a tool in the government's struggle with church groups over social policy, political freedoms and human rights." Sophisticated Koreans viewed the Graham/Bright efforts as simply a further extension of the government's program of "undermining strongly anti-government mobilizations among the country's four million Christians," writes an informed Japanese journalist.[7]

Since then, probably to Bright's embarrassment, the Park regime has greatly stepped up this "struggle," not only against Church groups, but also to crush students, lawyers, and dissident intellectuals. Since Park suspended the Constitution and promulgated his Emergency Decrees last January, his government has convicted by military tribunal almost two hundred suspected political dissenters and interrogated —often by torture—hundreds more. Korea's only living ex-President was arrested and convicted under the Decrees. Sentences ranging from five years to death have been meted out by these tribunals to large numbers of Protestant clergymen, a famous Catholic bishop, the country's best known poet, South Korea's foremost expert on Abraham Lincoln (and Boston University Ph.D.), a dean of theology at a major Korean University who graduated from Union Theological Seminary, a civil liberties lawyer from Yale University, and many others whose exposure to Western political values brought them only trouble. Thousands of Korean Catholics (at great personal risk) have attended mass rallies and vigils to protest the jailing of Bishop Daniel Chi Hak Soun. Korea's Protestant National Council of Churches recently denounced the repression under Park. Christian groups around the world, including the American Jesuit Conference and the World Council of Churches have joined in the protest against the American-backed regime.[8]

None of this, of course, disturbs veteran anti-communist Bill Bright, whose EXPLO '74, with government backing, attracted several hundred thousand South Koreans last August. "In no country in the world, including the U.S., is there more freedom to talk about Jesus Christ than in South Korea," he explains by way of justification. "There is no religious repression here. It is only political, and I believe it is for a good cause," Bright says that "those in prison"—presumably including his fellow Christians—"are involved in things they shouldn't be involved in." The slightest expression of dissent, he feels, may cause North Korea to instantly "pounce upon the republic." He accuses the U.S. press as well as the jailed Korean critics of slandering the Park regime and claims, "Those who oppose the regime are militant in their attack on anything that speaks of God, and if they had their way every Christian in South Korea today would be slaughtered." Joon Gon Kim, executive director of EXPLO '74, is no less outspoken in his defense of Campus Crusade's holy mission against world communism: "When the Korean church becomes aflame with the Holy Spirit God can rend the iron curtain of North Korea, China and Eastern Europe and the walls will collapse so that the Gospel can be preached."[9]

William Bright in the service of General Park's dictatorship might seem an extreme case, but his allies, especially those in the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, are no less fervent or dedicated. Just as Bright claims that General Park is working in the service of God by crushing his opponents, so did Bright's ally and Korean counterpart, the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, achieve notoriety when he announced last year in full page newspaper advertisements across the United States that President Nixon had been put into office by God and could be removed only by His will. Sun Myung Moon's National Prayer and Fast Committee stuck by Nixon to the bitter end. (Thus did Moon inevitably meet Rabbi Korff, who then obligingly spoke before a Moon-affiliated organization on "The Fact of Communism and America's Future.")[10]

The Reverend Moon is a new phenomenon in America, but not in Asia where his following now totals nearly a million people, concentrated in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Moon found his calling back in 1936 when Jesus Christ approached him on a mountainside and asked him to devote himself to God's service as an evangelist. Moon waited until 1954, however, before organizing a new world religion, the Genri Undo, or Unification Church, formerly called the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity. (Detractors claim he got off to a slow start because of three arrests for sexual offenses.)[11]

Despite the wide following in Asia, and his whirlwind American tour last year, Moon has not attracted a wide following in the United States, where he can claim only about 25,000 supporters. Now that he can no longer lead the campaign to save President Nixon, Sun Myung Moon has fallen back on more traditional approaches. Recently he spent $350,000 on radio, TV and other advertising to promote a major evangelical rally at Madison Square Garden to stimulate new support in the East. The event was held September 18 and attracted a large crowd of curious onlookers, hostile fundamentalists, leftist demonstrators, policemen, and atheists.[12]

Once described as a "Korean-style Elmer Gantry" but preferring the title, "God's Hope for America," the Reverend Moon preaches about the many dangers of communism along with his personal interpretation of the Bible. One Japanese source describes his movement as "less a religion than an anti-communist front group." Rabbi Mark Tannenbaum of the American Jewish Committee observes that "Moon seems to be exploiting the emotional power of religion in order to indoctrinate his anti-communist ideology. The tragedy is that so many young people respond to this emotional appeal." And he has predictably drawn fire from concerned clergymen, in the words of one, for his "seemingly cozy relationships with the dictatorial Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea." In reply to these charges a Moon spokesman insisted, "Many religions acknowledge the threat of Communism."[13]

Sun Myung Moon can afford to lavishly finance his propaganda activities. *Time estimated* his personal fortune at $15 million, derived from investments in a tea company, titanium mines, retreat ranches, pharmaceutical firms, and shot gun manufacturers. Recently his Unification Church purchased several es-

tates and an old seminary in New York for about $3 million. The question remains: is this vast international effort just a personal undertaking?[14]

Moon and his close associates are predictably silent, but disturbing evidence is emerging of his church's close ties to anti-communist *political* organizations with less spiritual ends.

For example, Moon's closest associate and English interpreter, Colonel Bo Hi Pak ("God's Colonel"), formerly a Korean military attache, has strong links to both Korean intelligence and the American CIA. He leads the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation (KCFF) which operates "Radio Free Asia," possibly an outgrowth of a project by the American organization, Committee for a Free Asia (now the Asia Foundation), funded by the CIA. KCFF also conducts propaganda operations in Vietnam. Its legal counsel is none other than Robert Amory, Jr., former deputy director of the CIA. In 1962 Amory almost became head of the Asia Foundation (he was turned down to avoid blowing the CIA cover); now he is a law partner in Corcoran, Roley, Youngman & Rowe, a firm which has long handled the legal work for CIA proprietaries.[15]

The possibility of CIA involvement with a right-wing movement now entering the United States is frightening enough. But just as troubling are the close financial ties of Moon's church to the world of wealthy neo-fascist Japanese capitalists, who seek not only a rollback of Communism but a new "Great Asia" under the Emperor, based on the integration of Korea and Formosa into the Japanese orbit.

In Japan, the chief financial backer and organizer of the Genri Undo is Sasagawa Ryoichi, the 75 year old former Class A war criminal. Back in 1931, with the notorious Kodama Yoshio, he formed a chauvinist patriotic party and intelligence organization that siphoned off enormous wealth from China during the Japanese occupation and ultimately provided much of the postwar financial backing for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In 1939 he set in



Sun Myung Moon at Madison Square Garden in New York.

Seoul police confront demonstration.

motion the negotiations leading to the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy; three years later he was elected to the Diet on an ultranationalist platform of southward expansion. His stint in the Sagumo Prison after World War II for suspected war crimes set back his career only a short while, for he and fellow inmates like Kodama Yoshio and former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke used their influence and time to plan the resurrection of the postwar Japanese Right.[16]

Both Sasagawa and Kodama still exercise enormous influence in Japan, and are described as "kukomaku"—powers behind the throne. The *New York Times*' description of Kodama applies identically to Sasagawa:

> Yoshio Kodama is among the most powerful men in Japan. He was instrumental in founding the nation's governing party, he has had a hand in naming several Premiers, he has settled dozens of disputes among top businessmen. He also commands the allegiance of Japan's ultra-right wing and has strong influence over the yakuza, or gangsters, of the underworld here.[17]

Both are dedicated to restoring the power of the Emperor and crushing opposition to the Right.

Sasagawa, as president of the Japan-Indonesia Association and Japan-Philippine Association, both reminiscent of the prewar imperialist South Seas Association, has helped to spearhead the southward Japanese commercial advance in Asia. He funded the anti-Sukarno forces which organized the Indonesian coup d'etat of September 30, 1965; he likewise supported the Lon Nol faction which overthrew King Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970, and arranged for Japanese economic aid to prop up the new government. Currently he is active in strengthening Japanese ties with the strategic Arabian peninsula, through his Japan-Oman Association.[18]

Most significantly, Sasagawa has long been a leading light in the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, and was behind the recent organization of the World Anti-Communist League. With his vast fortune acquired from shipbuilding, gambling, and organized crime, Sasagawa not only influences the Japanese government but acts as a powerful force in all of "Greater Asia." His support of Moon's Unification Church is thus just one of many elements in the constellation of interlocking activities surrounding the Japanese, Asian, and world right-wing movements which still thrive in many forms.

American "Bible Belt" fundamentalism has long been known as a source of the most extreme conservatism and almost fanatic anti-communism. Evangelical movements from this tradition, refined and directed by sophisticated "religious entrepreneurs" with modern marketing techniques and lavish funding, are "going international" on a larger scale than ever before in the service of established right-wing governments and organizations. Linked to old and well established anti-communist fronts composed of Eastern European emigres, embittered Cuban refugees, and Nationalist Chinese officials, these popular new evangelical movements are the forefront of a new wave of *political* propaganda, disguised as religion and designed to distract Third World peoples from their more pressing social needs and concerns. Whether this theology of anti-communism will have any appeal to the masses of Asia is doubtful, but it does represent a new level of struggle in the cold war that is still with us.

[1] Stanley Karnow, "The CIA in Flux," *New Republic*, December 8, 1973. Between 1961 and 1963 CIA foundations gave $142,500 to the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church outside of Russia.

[2] Peter Dale Scott, "Watergate, Cuba, and the China-Vietnam Lobby" (unpublished manuscript): APACL, *All Roads, lead to Freedom*: First Report (Taipei, 1955); APACL, *Proceedings of the First WACL Conference; Proceedings of the Third WACL Conference.*

[3] AMPO, Winter, 1974, p. 17; *Christianity Today*, August 16, 1974, pp. 28-9; June 22, 1973, pp. 33-4; September 28, 1973, pp. 52-3.

[4] *Christianity Today*, January 1, 1971, p. 43; June 9, 1972, pp. 38-9; *Christian Century*, December 24, 1969, pp. 1650-1651, Despite its name, Campus Crusade is "not a student-led program" but is controlled by Bright's central staff (*Christianity Today*, April 12, 1968, p. 40).

[5] *Christian Century*, May 10, 1972, pp. 549-51; July 19, 1972, pp. 778-80; *Christianity Today*, July 7, 1972, pp. 31-2.

[6] AMPO, Winter 1974, p. 16; *Christianity Today*, June 22, 1973, pp. 33-4; June 9, 1972, pp. 38-39. Campus Crusade actually has staff members at work in over fifty countries, where, as in the United States, its chief target group is students.

[7] *Washington Post*, August 19, 1974; AMPO, Winter, 1974, p. 17.

[8] The American press, especially the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, provided extensive coverage of the growing repression in Korea during the summer of 1974.

[9] *Washington Post*, August 19, 1974; *New York Times*, August 19, 1974.

[10] On Korff's close relationship to Moon, see *Washington Post*, July 25, 1974; *New York Post*, September 16, 1974. Rabbi Korff's latest project is to force Congress to impose severe curbs on the media, which he blames for President Nixon's downfall (*Washington Post*, August 17, 1974).

[11] *Daily News* (New York), September 13, 1974; *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1974, pp. 101-02; AMPO, Winter, 1974, p. 43; *New York Times*, September 16, 1974; *Village Voice*, September 12, 1974. Estimates vary as to the size of Moon's worldwide following; Moon's chief associate put the figure at over two million (*New York Times*, September 16, 1974).

[12] *New York Times*, September 16, 1974 (including full-page advertisement on p. 40); *Daily News*, September 13, 1974; *New York Times*, September 19, 1974; UPI dispatch, September 19, 1974; *Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 1974.

[13] AMPO, Winter, 1974, p. 43; *New York Post*, September 16, 1974. Moon's organization has created a number of secular anti-communist front groups including the international Federation for Victory over Communism, the World Freedom Institute, and the Freedom Leadership Foundation. The South Korean government sent its civil servants to an anti-communist indoctrination center in Seoul operated by the Church (*Village Voice*, September 12, 1974; *New York Times*, September 17, 1974).

[14] *Time*, October 15, 1973; pp. 129-30; *Daily News*, September 13, 1974; *Christianity Today*, March 1, 1974, pp. 101-02. Moon's church is worth "far more" than Moon's personal $15 million (*New York Times*, September, 16, 1974).

[15] *Village Voice*, September 12, 1974; Steve Weissman and John Shoch, "CIAsia Foundation," *Pacific Research*, September-October, 1972. One of Corcoran's earliest projects for the CIA was representing Chennault's Civil Air Transport, now Air America. CIA officials deny any ties to Moon's Unification Church, but funding of the Church remains mysterious (*Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 1974).

[16] AMPO, Winter, 1974, p. 43; *New York Times*, July 2, 1974; Don Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan* (Astor-Honor).

[17] *New York Times*, July 2, 1974, Sasagawa has been implicated in recent Japanese election irregularities. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 6, 1974, p. 28.

[18] AMPO, Winter, 1974, pp. 43-5.

Spanish and Korean People Lose a Friend

Dr. Edward K. Barsky with French physicist Mme. Irene Joliot-Curie and Professor Albert Einstein.

Dr. Edward K. Barsky, famed surgeon and early U.S. anti-fascist fighter, who served the Republican Armed forces in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, died on Tuesday, February 11, 1975, at the age of 79, in New York City.

Dr. Barsky was one of the original sponsors and builders of AKFIC, among the first subscribers and contributors to Korea Focus, and a steadfast supporter of AKFIC activities in support of US-Korean people's friendship and an end to U.S. interference in the internal affairs of the Korean nations.

Those veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, now active in AKFIC and Korea Focus, knew him as an indomitable man whose contribution to the cause of Spanish democracy, a unified Korea and world peace, will never be forgotten.

We will remember this hero in battle as a soldier of peace all his lifetime. Salud!

THE EDITORS

U.S. Imperialism Zeroes in on Korea and Spain

Publication of Milton Wolff's article, submitted to the editors some time ago, was held up to give David Buehrens the opportunity to prepare his contribution to this dialogue.

Rapid progress of the freedom struggle in Spain and in neighboring Portugal while hastening the day of liberation for the Spanish people, in no way alters the basic premises Wolff advances.

For 36 years small groups of industrial and agricultural workers, student bodies and Republican forces that pre-date the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 have worked clandestinely to overthrow the Franco government. Today, however, the anti-Franco movement, united in the Democratic Alliance of Spain embraces all of Spanish society whose interests are in conflict with a continuation of the stultifying fascist regime.

The erosion of the strength of the government of the 82-year-old Franco has been markedly accelerated by the growing opposition to the dictatorship by business interests and, significantly, the Catholic Church and younger echelons of the military.

The main base of Franco's remaining strength continues, as it has since the end of World War II, to lie in the policy of the U.S. government. Without its secret treaty with Washington, which permits the U.S. to defend the Franco dictatorship against foreign and domestic foes, the fascist government would be overwhelmed by democratic forces.

THE EDITORS

•The following article seriously probes very important questions concerning the struggle for reunification of Korea. Despite our disagreement with some of the author's conclusions which we make clear in our own comments, prepared by Mr. Buehrens in the second article, we publish the above article in the interest of further exploring some of the fundamental aspects of reunification presented by the author. Readers wishing to comment for publication in *Korea Focus* in coming issues are most welcome. Editorial Board.

By MILTON WOLFF

A buried seven-line AP item on a proposed meeting of "North and South Korea's Delegates" in the *San Francisco Chronicle* may be a reflection of this city's interest in the event, an expression of cynicism as to the usefulness of such a meeting, or simply a display of ignorance on the part of the editorial staff. That staff being no better than most in the country, I suspect the latter.

While most Americans today know that there is such a place as Korea, somewhat because we fought a war there but mostly because of a movie and a current TV situation comedy series called M*A*S*H, that country, singular or divided, remains remote, wrapped in mystery and legend, unreal even to the fifty-four thousand bereaved mothers and widows created by a war which also slaughtered millions of Koreans.

Of particular interest to me is the contrasting fact that this same *Chronicle* will cover on a daily basis and sometimes at great length events occurring in Spain. While there are still many Americans who continue to confuse the Spanish-American War with the Spanish Civil War, many more have at least a generalized idea about its geographical and political location so that a headline announcing "Franco Demands U.S. Treaty in Exchange for Bases" excites more comment than "Why not?"

Milton Wolff fought for the Republic of Spain as a soldier in the 15th International Brigade during the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War. A machine gunner, he rose from private to become commander of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, with the rank of Major.

It is not my purpose here to analyze the symptoms nor probe for the causes of this apparent indifference on the one hand and concern on the other. I note it only because the stakes are so bloody high for the American people in both instances right now.

"As is well known," American military bases in Spain are there to protect that country from possible attack by the Barbary Apes now multiplying on the Rock of Gibraltar and in desperate need of Lebensraum. Admittedly, the deployment of a nuclear strike force in the area may be overdoing it a bit considering the primitive weaponry available to the apes, but one can never be too careful. And there is the absolute need to preserve the Mediterranean as a safe pond upon which cruise ships can cruise and the Onassises disport on yacht or island paradise. Our interests also include the protection of Greek Generals hard pressed by unarmed Greek students, Israeli war hawks misleading a peaceful people under the spell of chauvinist racism and a fanatical "Greater Israel" of Biblical mythology, oil monopolies catatonically pumping spiraling profits in concert with Arabian reactionaries, and other assorted vital commitments which we are honor-bound to honor, too many to list here and already familiar to the reader of *Korea Focus*–and not to mention R&R (rest and recreation) for our men in uniform so arduously engaged in Showing the Colors.

Landlord-Tenant Relation–U.S. Imperialist Style

As in Spain, Korea and elsewhere, the things about having bases abroad is that one must lease them from a host country. Aside from the normal cost in rent, there exists another problem–the tenant is hostage to the landlord. Now the interesting thing about American bases all over the world is that they exist (with one exception) in countries run by "landlords" who in one way or another–be it Marshall Plan or outright intervention–owe their position to the lessee, Uncle Sam. (The exception being Cuba, for obvious reasons.) Thus, Master and Puppet are able to work out "secret agreements," circumventing the necessity of submitting treaties to elected public bodies where they exist and where some concern for the national interests of the parties involved might serve to limit the extent of a "sell-out."

In the case of both Spain and South Korea (as elsewhere, I am sure), we have "secret commitments" which include as a most significant article the proposition that the United States will protect its puppet in the event that Spaniard or Korean elect to unseat him.

In the honoring of this cardinal article, we have undertaken to arm his military forces, to pay his generals, to train his secret service and police forces; and, if he still faces dispossession in spite of all these deeds, to directly intervene where other means fail. It is for this reason that the democratic resistance forces want the United States out of Spain. They don't want Spain to become another Viet Nam.

Reunification–Is it Possible Half Socialist-Half Capitalist

And the same is true for South Korea. Park Chung Hee is not threatened by North Korea, or the USSR. The desire of the Korean people to unseat the present administration in Seoul does not emanate from a well-spring of "unity-at-any-price" but from a deep dissatisfaction with Park and his cohorts who have opened their half of the nation to the profit-hungry nationals of the great imperialist powers, past and present. That the unification of the country is an important part of this motivating force stems from the incontrovertible fact that the people will only be masters in their own half when they have become part of the whole. And they cannot achieve this goal with an American armed force quartered in their land much as King George III garrisoned the American colonies with Red Coats in the 1770's. As the struggle against tax-enforcers, exploiters, and military policemen helped forge the thirteen disparate colonies into one nation, so the struggle against the puppets and their foreign protectors will help bring about the unification of Korea.

We can accept without question that the Korean people would like to get rid of the artificial wall that divides them. What matters concretely is the loyalty of the Korean people on this or that side to its particular administration, and that loyalty is tendered or withheld on the basis of administratve performance.

This is not meant to imply that the fires of national independence burn with less heat in the visceral ovens of the common man than in the cerebral kilns of statesmen and politicians, but only to suggest that as an ideal it is not worth the carnage it has engendered in the history of man's bloody passage through time. By and large this has been understood by exploitative ruling classes from almost the beginning of time, since they have always, when pressed to make the choice, opted to preserve and perpetuate their class interests rather than sacrifice economic advantages for national integrity.

Franco, like Pinochet in Chile, betrayed his country and his people by selling out to foreign nationals in exchange for a partnership in profiteering–to fascist Germany and Italy when expedient, and as pragmatically to the multi-national consortiums when that became the order of the day for the survival of the Spanish bourgeoisie.

Park represents this historical phenomenon in Seoul today, and this being the case, it makes it a bit difficult for me to ideate a set of conditions whereby Park's *class* and foreign patrons will unprotestingly submit to *merger* with the Socialist North in the name of national independence.

Frankly, my mind cannot grasp the notion that two segments–north and south, the one socialist, the other capitalist–can come together without one or the other changing its basic social system in one direction or the other, either as the result of an upheaval in one segment or a shotgun marriage performed with the help of an outside force on behalf of one system against the other. The idea that socialism and free enterprise can live side by side with each other under a single banner is, it seems to me, less probable or historical validation than Lincoln's judgment ". . . this Nation cannot exist half slave and half free." I do not know of any instance where radically differing systems have been able to come together to function as one. And how they can be one and function as two boggles this mind. Not in Ireland, in Arabia, in Germany, nor yet Taiwan with Mainland China.

A bit of socialism in a capitalist state, or a bit of free enterprise in a socialist state remains a possibility only where the bits have been introduced, or retained, within a nation entire. But where the two systems have been arbitrarily

separated by co-ordinates and each entrenched on its side of the line it would seem to me that line can only be summarily erased rather than gradually eroded. After all, isn't that what borders are all about?

Under the Monarchy and under Franco, both Basque and Catalan yearned and fought for autonomy and even separation. The separatist nationalism here involved was and *is* the offspring of oppression. The Catalan and the Basque are oppressed as Spaniards are in all of Spain but more so as Basques whose resources and labor are expropriated by the Castillian "caciques" and foreign interests and as Catalans whose industry and commerce are likewise diverted.

This is a struggle for national liberation which is, in other words, a struggle against foreign exploitation and expropriation. Like all such struggles it emphasizes differences, e.g.: religion, language, tradition, etc., and more or less, as the situation demands, ignores the ties-that-bind, e.g.: history, common natural borders, defense, mutuality of interests, etc. However, under the Republic (1931-1939) and especially during the last three years of Popular Front support for the Republic, Catalan and Basque fought to preserve the nation as one; for the Republic held the promise and the hope of fulfillment of the totality of Catalan and Basque ideals as part of a similar fulfillment for all Spaniards.

So while today there is Catalan and Basque separatist resistance to the central dictatorship, the mainstream of resistance is one with the united resistance of the Spanish underground, the illegal trade union movement, and activist students, intellectuals, and religiosos. Madrid, Bilbao, and Barcelona support and complement each other in a fight to overthrow the dictatorship, a fight increasing in intensity and involving an ever-growing number of Spaniards from all walks of life everywhere.

The situation in Korea is as different as it is similar. National aspiration is an unqualified unifying movement among the people in all of Korea. The separatist anti-unification element is narrowly confined to the Seoul-U.S. axis, though they must pay lip service to the popular cause of unity. Where in Spain the American military presence serves to keep in power a dictatorship subjugating Catalan, Basque,

Asturian, Andalusian, Castillian—in short, all of Spain regardless of National aspirations—in Korea an American Army of Occupation serves to keep in power a dictatorship whose tenuous grip on the south depends on preventing the unification of the country.

Since one should properly rule out the possibility of *convergence,* one must confront the reality of *conversion.* Socialism is the new system destined to replace dying capitalism. Obviously Lenin did not have an artificially divided Korea in mind when he posited the tactics of "one step backward . . . two steps forward . . ." The DPRK is not about to retreat from socialist construction to some form of capitalist accommodation in order to achieve a unity that in some future time will move the entire nation in the direction of socialism.

Against the renewal of talks between the north and the south, one must weigh the significance of Park Chung Hee's rapid strides toward absolute dictatorship in the Franco mold, in the south. The symbolic gesture of meetings with the DPRK must be examined in the same manner as one examines the meaning of increased repression of the democratic forces inside South Korea. Seen in this way it is clear that meetings on unifying the country are only a hypocritical tactic designed to deprive the opposition of one rallying point

and part of the repression designed to strangle that part of the opposition more broadly based that cannot be duped.

The unity meetings arose in part as a consequence of the general international spirit of detente. The Nixon-Kissinger tentative acceptance of the concept first formulated by the USSR and most dramatically signaled by Nixon's trips to Moscow and Peking, undoubtedly must affect the foreign and trade policies of all nations, even divided ones. However, detente among nations does not immediately affect the relationships between classes, the conflict between democratic trends and the forces of fascism, except adversely. As normalization of state relationships between socialist and capitalist countries move forward it becomes ever more necessary for the guardians of each of the systems to increase their vigilance lest respective power bases become eroded in the process. Though inevitable long-term detente cannot but improve the lot of all peoples, in the short term it brings greater repression in those countries where tyranny is the form of government—as in Spain and South Korea.

Trade between the Socialist countries and fascist Spain, for instance, increases yearly and now stands at an all-time high. Circuses, dance groups, etc. are freely exchanged. Over the long haul, this trade and cultural interpenetration must exert an influence on the people of Spain; and from the "long view" way of looking at history, the more progressive wellspring of all this good-will and good-business will come to prevail among the trading and swinging partners. Yet at this "point in time," fascist repression in Spain has likewise hit an "all time high."

Furthermore, there has been no indication on the part of Dr. Kissinger/Ford that existing American bases in Spain—or in Korea—will be abandoned in the near future as a consequence of detente. This is easily understandable because said bases have nothing to do with detente. They were not installed and maintained because of a lack of detente between socialist countries and the United States. They were emplaced and are being kept principally because of an absence of detente between the ruling class of the host countries—the class that serves American imperialism—and the people who are struggling for democratic, progressive national self-expression.

The imperial way is now not so smooth as once it was. Where once the resources and markets of all the "lesser" nations represented a limitless cornucopia gifted by God and by the grace of the Marine Corps, there now is a price to be paid. The developing nations, once colonies, are developing their own resources for their own benefit and markets of their own choosing. Shielded in the first place by the socialist countries and consequently able to wield power in the United Nations, the "Third World" has taken its resources and its destiny into its own hands, relieving the white man of his "burden." Bribery and extortion are becoming as much an anachronism as is the Bible-bearing missionary.

While the ruder methods of imperialism have, in the main, to be abandoned sooner or later, the defeat of first France and then the United States in Indo-China has hastened the process. And while more subtle methods have had to be devised and employed (such as AID, CIA, etc.) sometimes with success as in Chile and Greece, nevertheless such methods are suffering from over-exposure.

However, in South Korea as in Spain, the classic imperialist way holds sway, principally because the armed forces of the imperialist power are already in place. Before the factors come into play that freed, either totally or to some degree, the "lesser" nations in the past, the imperial armies of occupation have to be dislodged. While it has become increasingly difficult for the imperial powers to deposit armed forces in a foreign country, it is also not a simple matter to evict them.

While the victories of the Vietnamese people in this regard are an inspiration to all oppressed and/or divided nations, we cannot, should not, ask any people to pay the price in blood Viet Nam paid and is still paying. The first obligation of every American in this regard is to assume the task of recalling our forces from South Korea and Spain. If we once again assign this task to the victimized people themselves, their blood will be on our hands. For there can be no doubt that in the end, the people of Spain and the people of Korea will work their will and have their way—how and at what cost is up to us.

Korea, Detente and National Independence

By DAVID B. BUEHRENS

In his essay Milton Wolff seems to be concerned mainly with the large questions of detente and the transition to socialism as these bear on the goal of Korean reunification. His remarks are a significant contribution to a dialogue on these issues not only because they embody a widely held perspective of international relations but because they touch on one of the keys to current world trends, the *process* of detente. I repeat, *process,* for detente is a development rather than a status; it cannot remain the same.

An increasingly prevalent pattern of interaction and interrelationship at various levels characterizes socialist and non-socialist states today. Ties are expanding in the areas of commerce, cultural exchange, political-diplomatic consultation and treaty-making as never before. Moreover, the quality of such ties is more durable than ever: five, ten- and fifteen-year agreements on economic and other joint ventures are no longer uncommon between capitalist, socialist and newly independent developing countries around the world. A number of non-socialist and pre-socialist countries are now participating broadly in the coordinated planning of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Nor is there much evidence, incidentally, that these trends are forestalling the deepening general crisis of world capitalism.

The main result of these developments is a lessening of world tension, particularly military tension, and hence a lessening of the possibility of major international conflict. Opportunities for consolidating peace and isolating the war-makers are enhanced. This is far from producing automatic guarantees against the outbreak or continuance of war in such areas as Indochina and the Middle East, but it is far better than a world in which nuclear war-threats are part of the everyday language of diplomacy. I am convinced that many otherwise perceptive, progressively oriented people living in the United States do not recognize the full import of detente precisely because they live in the country whose leaders have, for various specific reasons, dragged their heels most, despite all their boast of world "leadership," in this process of detente. The warhawks, the spokesmen for unconditional support of Israeli expansion, for endless support of the Thieus and Pinochets of modern fascism, are still very much with us.

A few comments are in order here on "convergence," since it is sometimes assumed that detente implies convergence a la Sakharov—a kind of schematic triad where the result is an amalgam of the components: chicken and noodles make chicken noodle soup, ergo capitalism and socialism in interrelation must make . . . capitalism-socialism. But history does not work so neatly and mechanically. Convergence could also mean the *conversion* of a capitalist or neo-colonialist, policy to a socialist one. And that of course, as Lenin's own example illustrates, might well mean many steps backward, all told, for many more forward steps. But closer, even confederal relations between the two parts of the Korean peninsula should be seen *as a great step forward.* For why, if the Leninist Bolsheviks, during a time of great weakness internally and internationally, appealed for a continuation of close diplomatic economic relations with the imperialist states—why should not the two governments in Korea today, in much more favorable circumstances, strive for closer relations looking toward eventual reunification. After all, unlike the Bolsheviks and the capitalist states, the Koreans are, let us not forget, part of the same nation. In contrast to Lenin's time, every passing day gives additional witness to the fragility of world capitalism and its protectorates like "South Korea," compared to the strength and durability of the DPRK, which, at every level of its existence, relies on its own resources to an extent unthinkable to the Seoul regime. To compare the nature and

quality of the two Korean states, as though they are somehow counterpoises of equal weight, is therefore quite misleading. There is every reason to expect that, on the contrary, Korean socialism will thrive and neo-colonialist influence wither as the two governments orient themselves toward eventual national reunification. Why that kind of orientation should mean "retreat" is unclear to me. It should, on the other hand, both express and confirm the superiority of socialism, linked up as it would be to the great current of national liberation sweeping the world.

Further, to assert as Wolff does, that "detente in the short term . . . brings greater repression in those countries where tyranny is the form of government as in Spain and South Korea" is to mistake associate symptoms with cause and effect relations. It is not more reasonable to say that it is *resistance to detente,* including ruling class fear and aversion to developing North-South Korean ties, that lies behind the current repression of the Seoul regime? Is the repression in Spain the result of detente or is it primarily a product of a reactionary class striving to suppress internal change?

Is it not also true that in countries like South Africa, Rhodesia, South Vietnam and Israel, where detente is hardly proclaimed as an important goal, that oppression is intensifying? Strange, unprecedented forces are astir in the world, and not alone in countries like Portugal and Greece, among others, where, incidentally, political overtures toward detente have coincided with a growth of domestic freedom, not a restriction. And so did they in Chile also, until the fascist *golpe.* But was that the fault of those who urged detente or the fault of the architects of cold war anti-communism? The latter might indeed, for reasons of their own convenience, prefer to manipulate the image rather than fulfill the substance of detente. Should we then blame detente instead of its opponents, however they may try to hide their true intentions? It seems we might as well blame socialism because Hitler at first called himself a National Socialist!

In any event, detente is primarily an international (inter-state) trend, not an intranational one, and should not become the whipping boy of internal reaction, whether from

the right or the phrasemongering "infantile left."

It seems to me equally unreasonable to blame the bloodshed caused in national independence movements on their participants rather than on those who resist their just goals. Are the millions of Koreans and Vietnamese dead really victims of suicide or of genocide? Are they not, in their herioc sacrifice, part of the colossal, tragic wastage of imperialism? It is sometimes too easy to fall into the habit of blaming the victim.

To go back to Korea: for meaningful detente to develop there, either Park Chung Hee and his clique must go, or undergo a "change of heart." Neither is impossible, but it would seem that the first is more likely, given increasing U.S. weakness and the growing isolation of anti-communist forces on the world scene—in Greece, Portugal, even Japan. One of the main fallacies of Mr. Wolff's commentary is thus the apparent assumption that the Park Chung Hee closed-door attitude will and must be unchanging.

If King Hussein can change his attitude toward the PLO, Park Chung Hee conceivably could also change. But I think there is more possibility here for a change of guard—not an imminent socialist revolution, mind you—that would find room for a more open-door policy toward the DPRK. Wolff concedes that "the separatist anti-unification elements are narrowly confined to the Seoul-U.S. axis, though it must pay lip-service to the popular cause of unity." If that axis can be fractured, as apparently happened in Greece, for example, and may well soon happen in Cambodia and South Vietnam as in Laos, why can it not fracture also in Korea?

In an interview with the *New York Times,* (*Korea Focus,* Vol. I, No. 3) the leader of the DPRK, Pres. Kim Il Sung, emphasizes why developing relations between the two parts of Korea are, in fact, quite conceivable, even while each part retains its essential characteristics. Such relations, of course, would lay the groundwork for future reunification, *but should not be confused with it:*

"At present, some foreign journalists say there are two opposite poles in Korea—North Korea's socialist system and South Korea's capitalist system—and that these two places cannot be integrated. Once these two poles touch, they say, war will break out again in Korea.

"We do not regard South Korea as a capitalist society in the true sense of the word. There are no big monopoly capitalists in south Korea, only a few comprador capitalists . . . We are not against national capitalists and small medium entrepreneurs. We can say that South Korean society is not more than a society which is just starting to take the road of capitalism, or believes in capitalism, or something like that.

". . . It is possible that a country may have different political systems . . . even after the country is reunified the present social systems in the north and the south may continue as they are, and people who have different beliefs may live together in Korea."

Elsewhere, Pres. Kim Il Sung envisions "a North-South Confederation under the single name of the State. A good name for the Confederal State could be the Confederal Republic of Koryo, after Koryo, the name of the Unified State which existed once on the territory of our country." (Five-Point Program for Unification, June 23, 1973, *Korea Focus,* Vol. II, No. 2) Some time later, "if an atmosphere of trust is created between the north and the south, the independent, peaceful reunification of the country can be attained by the method of establishing an all-Korea unified government through north-south general elections on a democratic basis without any interference of outside forces." (Ibid)

As Lenin foresaw, the final achievement of socialism, in many of the countries of the formerly colonial world, including Korea, must be predicated on "national liberation." A confederation of north and south Korea, no more impossible than a Vietnam confederation, would be the giant, crucial step in that national liberation. National liberation and class liberation are interrelated but must not be confused. I believe precisely such a confusion underlies much of Milton Wolff's pessimism about eventual Korean reunification and the bloodshed he thinks it must entail.

Like detente, reunification and national liberation are also a process—for Korea and for other countries. Korea is basically a *national unit* by history, culture, language, ethnic back-

ground. Unlike Spain and a number of other *states,* the *nation of* Korea has a degree of national homogeneity that has precluded the internal generation of *national* antagonisms. Nevertheless, because of the artificial political division forced upon this nation by the imperialist proponents of "better half than nothing," a political realization of Korea's national unity is not only desirable but difficult. It will take time, effort, struggle, qualitative systematic change.

No one, I think, imagines the final achievement of socialism in Korea, or in Vietnam for that matter, as not ultimately entailing reunification, since each "half," as in Vietnam, expresses a *national,* self-consciousness that can only come to fruition with unification. It is therefore noteworthy that the NLF of South Vietnam, enjoying wide popular support, never has pressed for immediate unification with the socialist North, nor even the immediate intensive construction of socialism. There is a wise awareness of the various artificial impediments to such reunification, the result of decades of foreign intervention, which must first be recognized and dealt with. For that reason, and the fact that the entire nation is not subject to the U.S. sphere of influence, the analogy of Vietnam and Korea is more appropriate than that of Spain and Korea.

Moreover, such *national* independence, of which national unification is the natural corollary, will depend as much on the "visceral ovens of the common man" as on the "cerebral kilns of statesmen and politicians," athough if such an invidious comparison must be made, one might wonder whether "politicians" should be so favored. Reunification then would be the result of mass national awareness, interchange and pressure exerted over years, not the result of the finagling or counter-finagling of "statesmen." Thus steps involving increased contracts, communication, commerce, coordinating, as proposed by the DPRK, are indeed steps and means toward a goal, not its fulfillment. Moreover, it should be stressed that the context of these proposals presupposes the disengagement (withdrawal) of U.S. military forces from Korea, which in itself would be a not insignificant expression of Korean independence.

Speculation as to whether the qualitative change of reunification must in the future be violent in the traditional sense is akin to speculation whether socialism *must* always come through mass upheaval. That question was wisely left open by Marx and Engels to the contingencies of the future and it would be wise, in a time of weakening imperialist influence, to follow their lead. Nor should the question of the *desirability* and *possibility* of reunification (under whatever conditions and at what time), be confused with *whether* it will or will not take place as now envisioned.

> It is unthinkable to all that our nation, which has lived as a single nation on the same peninsula through a long history, should be divided into two parts in our generation.
>
> If there are any forces demanding division among the Koreans, they are only a handful of South Korean comprador capitalists who are servants of foreign monopoly capital and political stooges of U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism.
>
> Speech by Kim Il Sung, Oct. 27, 1973
> *Korea Focus,* Vol. II, No. 3, page 8

Korean reunification, like peace, detente, socialism, is not a matter of now or never, all or nothing, this or not at all. These are all matters of various specific sets of concrete opportunities, every set of which has an element of uniqueness. The Koreans, like the Vietnamese (NLF Program) have elected to strive for peaceful reunification. I see no reason why they should not be given every encouragement.

Dirty War in Korea 1950-1953. Atomic Warmakers Set Back By People's Drive for Peace

John Hitz graduated Yale with a BA in anthropology and from Fordham University with an MA. He received a Fulbright scholarship for study in Brazil. At present he teaches math and Spanish in the New York City educational system, is currently Chairman of the West Side Marxist Forum Center; and a member of the Editorial Board of Korea Focus.

By JOHN HITZ

On July 10, 1951, a little over a year after the start of the Korean War, truce negotiations between the opposing sides began. The initiative for the negotiations was that of the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Yakov Malik. The talks were to continue for two years before the fighting stopped.

In order to understand the military factors leading to the affirmative US response to the Soviet initiative, the several phases of the war must be described:

1) US-South Korean aggression and provocation (June 1950);

2) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) counteroffensive (summer and early fall 1950); US and South Korean forces driven to the far south of the Korean peninsula;

3) US offensive (fall 1950) consisting of massive landings at Pusan and Inchon; US troops drive toward the Yalu River separating China from DPRK; MacArthur talks of "final offensive" to begin on 11/25/50 and terminate war;

4) entry of Chinese forces into war (November 1950); US driven below 38th Parallel again; US under Ridgway pushes back to 38th Parallel; MacArthur fired on 4/11/51 for advocating wider war;

5) stalemate around 38th Parallel (late spring 1951 until end of war in July 1953); Malik makes call for armistice and negotiations on 6/23/51; negotiations begin and continue, with interruptions, until armistice signed on 7/26/53; US attempts several "major offensives," all ending in failure; by January 1953, the only issue preventing armistice is repatriation of prisoners of war.

This outline is schematic and omits much detail, but it furnishes a basis for analyzing the U.S. reaction to the war during its second year. According to *Newsweek* (12/31/51), the war had reached a stalemate by June 1951 and either "had to be broadened in order to reach a decision or a truce had to be arranged." There were definitely powerful elements in the U.S. who wanted to pursue the former option and pushed for "decisive" offensive actions: these invariably failed due to the extraordinary resistance of DPRK and Chinese forces. For example, during August 1951 the U.S. began a massive attack on the ground and in the air called "Operation Stranglehold." It failed, and Hanson Baldwin stated (NY *Times* 11/29/51): "There is good reason to believe that the enemy is as strong if not stronger than he was when the interdiction and isolation campaign started."

The hawks in the U.S. were continuously coming up with new ideas for ending the war on U.S. terms: bombing Chinese airfields, attacking China with a general mass offensive, and even using atomic weapons.* New "small" atomic weapons had been developed by U.S. warmakers.

Ten thousand U.S. troops in Korea were re-

Sources: The most important sources for information on the peace movevement during the Korean War were the *Daily Worker* and the *National Guardian*. The establishment press ignored the peace movement whenever possible and is less useful.

* The closest the U.S. came to carrying out any of these ideas was the bombing of hydroelectric plants serving both Korea and China on 6/23/52. It was one of the last efforts by the U.S. to break the stalemate and it caused a furor with the "allies," who were not consulted.

ceiving atomic warfare training in May 1952, according to AP and UPI. And the U.S. had almost completed development of the hydrogen bomb, more powerful by far than the A-bomb.

U.S. spokesmen constantly attempted to dehumanize Koreans and Chinese by reporting false or unsubstantiated reports of "atrocities" against U.S. PO's (while the U.S. itself was murdering POW's on Koje Island). According to the *National Guardian*, these horror stories "produced a babel of shrieking headlines, demands from Congressmen and newspapers for atomic incineration of the 'sub-barbarians'."

While the public in the U.S. was being softened up for possible use of atomic weapons in Korea, Koreans were actually being incinerated by a devastating weapon: the napalm bomb. It was praised by military spokesmen as developing "such terrific heat that it makes Communists evaporate." During the first 20 months of the war 17 million pounds of napalm were shipped to Korea, an amount five times greater than that used during all of World War II. 95 percent of it was delivered to targets by planes in the form of bombs.

The use of bacteriological warfare by the U.S. in Korea and Northeast China was charged by the USSR, China, and the DPRK in 1952, and evidence was produced. It included pictures of insects, spiders, and rodents, the bombs and shells used to deliver them, and depositions by scientists, physicians, witnesses, and victims. The diseases allegedly spread included cholera, plague, and encephalitis. Three distinguished Western scientists, Dr. Joseph Needham (Britain), Prof. Samuel B. Pessoa (Brazil), and Dr. Andrea Andreen (Sweden), corroborated the evidence of plague, and plague had been unknown in Korea, north or south, during the previous five centuries. It should be noted that the U.S. has never ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of bacteriological and chemical warfare.

Containment—A policy of counter-revolution

U.S. foreign policy during this period is summed up in the word "containment." The Truman-Acheson program was to "contain Communism" and not to let it "spread" from the countries that were already socialist.

Containment was not the only policy suggested in the U.S. to deal with socialism. Others were: 1) preventive war against the USSR and China (advocated by MacArthur); 2) Fortress America (arming ourselves to the teeth but not getting involved in foreign wars—advocated by isolationists mostly from the western U.S.); 3) "liberation of the satellites" (advocacy of returning the Eastern European countries to capitalist rule). The only one of these three taken seriously by the Truman administration was the third, and under Truman many programs were developed, including propaganda (Radio Free Europe), espionage, CIA, sabotage, and economic blockade, to weaken the new people's democracies in Eastern Europe.

Important for Truman's containment policy was the rearmament of the U.S.'s former enemies. The U.S. signed a bilateral peace treaty with Japan on 9/8/51, giving itself the right to maintain bases on Japanese soil indefinitely and allowing U.S. intervention to put down internal disturbances in Japan. The final peace treaty between West Germany and the Western powers went into effect on 5/26/52 and German rearmament was officially sanctioned. Italy was receiving massive military aid.

In the matter of disarmament, the USSR proposed immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the Big Five. These proposals were met by unrealistic U.S. demands for "foolproof" inspection, widely seen by even the bourgeois press at this time as a maneuver to avoid negotiating on disarmament at all.

By early 1952, according to the *National Guardian*, the U.S. was

> "committed to 'protect' some 37 countries (560 million people, 45% of the rest of the world's area), with U.S. military aid going to an additional nine countries (170 million people); military missions operating in 30 countries; over 100 U.S. air bases in some 10 nations and their colonies. Altogether 60 nations have agreements for U.S. military or economic aid under the Mutual Security Agency. . . ."

The history of U.S. defense spending during the early post-World War II period gives some idea of the nation's priorities at this time. Defense spending in fiscal 1945, the last year of

World War II, was $90.9 billion. It decreased to $10.3 billion by 1947, and from 1947 to 1950 remained under $12 billion per year. During fiscal 1951 (July 1950-June 1951), the figure was $22 billion, rising to $44 billion in 1952 and to $50 billion in 1953. This expansion of defense spending reflects not only the Korean War, but the cost of sending four U.S. divisions to Europe on a semi-permanent basis in 1951, large increases in appropriations for new air force and nuclear weapons systems, and the cost of U.S. military bases abroad. The figures do not include military "aid" to other countries. Meanwhile, of course, Truman's much-heralded "Fair Deal" social programs in the areas of public housing, national health insurance, and federal aid to education were either shelved or unfunded.

Ike rides into the White House on "End Korean War" slogan

1952 was a presidential election year, and as Truman declared on 3/29/52 that he would not run, the field was wide open in both the Republican and Democratic Parties. Eisenhower finally made up his mind to be a Republican and received the support of the so-called "moderate", "internationalist" wing of the party, made up of people like John Foster Dulles, Thomas E. Dewey, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Nelson Rockefeller. This group of powerful ruling-class interests, mostly from the East and West Coasts, basically supported Truman's foreign and defense policies, but during the campaign criticized him for not moving fast enough to end the stalemate in Korea.

The Democrats were on the defensive. They had to take responsibility for an increasingly unpopular war and they had been unable to fulfill any of their promises for needed social legislation. The Democratic presidential candidates unanimously supported Truman's foreign policy of "containment of Communism" by massive military and economic aid and, if necessary, provision of U.S. troops, and their disagreements were primarily on domestic issues. As demagogic as Eisenhower's campaign was, his promise to "go to Korea" appealed to the war-weary electorate, and as a famous general he could never be accused of "selling out to the Communists." He won the elections by a massive margin.

In the arena of legislative activity during the second year of the Korean War, a few highlights will establish the general trend. In June 1952, Congress passed, again over Truman's veto, another of Senator Pat McCarran's infamous bills**, this one called variously the McCarran-Walter Act or the Immigration and Nationality Act. This act, which determined U.S. immigration policy until 1965, basically reaffirmed an earlier racist US government position. It continued the bias in favor of white Northern Europeans by setting country-by-country immigration quotas based on the nation of origin of the U.S. population in 1920. Thus, for example, British, Irish, and German nationals were entitled to practically free immigration to the U.S., while Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, Eastern Europeans, Jews, and Africans had to wait many years to be able to immigrate. Asians remained barred from the right to become naturalized citizens. The chauvinism of the McCarran-Walter Act did not go uncriticized in Congress. Representative Celler of New York said it was "aimed not at curtailing but in fact stopping all immigration to the U.S." McCarran, in reply to his critics, said that they were the same ones that had opposed his anti-Communist Internal Security Act and that they would "wittingly or unwittingly lend themselves to efforts which would poison the bloodstream of the country."

Other bills and appropriations passed by Congress during this period included: the authorization of $100 million to recruit escapees from socialist nations for NATO armed forces; the provision of $84 million for Voice of Amer-

An unaccountable error of an anti-Semitic character appeared in the first article of this series published in the last issue of Korea Focus. The editors seriously regret the error.

** In terms of long-term effect, it must be concluded that McCarran's contribution to reaction in the early 1950's was probably greater than any other legislator's, including that of Joseph McCarthy.

Leaflet on facing page condemning U.S. agreesion in Korea was published by the United Electrical Workerr Union in July 1950.

MAJOR GENERAL

SMEDLEY BUTLER

on Wall Street foreign policy

"I spent 33 years in active service as a member of our country's most agile military force–the Marine Corps. And during that period I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers.

"Thus I helped make Mexico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers . . . I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests . . . I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies . . . In China, in 1927, I helped see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested."

–General Butler was the most famous commandant in the history of the U.S. Marines.

KOREA

and the

HONEST AMERICAN WORKER

Here is the South Korean 'Democracy' American Blood is Now Defending

- **Factory wages less than $1 a week (1-12 bushel of rice). Half of the population dies before age 30.**
- **3 million adult unemployed out of 21 million population.**
- **All militant and sincere union leaders arrested or dead.**
- **Compulsory arbitration and government wage regulation.**
- **80-90 hour week in textile, transport and other industries.**
- **Extreme child labor widespeard (even 12-year olds).**
- **Korean people over 90% illiterate.**
- **Strikes prohibited.**
- **Political action prohibited.**
- **With all "communists" purged, 89,000 other labor and "political" prisoners jailed — many times the number jailed under Japanese occupation.**
- **Standard of living lower than under Japanese rule.**
- **Prices 800 times 1936 levels.**
- **Unemployed and families have no means of subsistence whatever.**
- **Native production declined radically under American Military Government occupation.**

THAT'S NOT FREEDOM — IT'S SLAVERY

ica's anti-Communist programming; a bill providing for the screening of foreign seamen for their political beliefs before allowing them shore leave in U.S. ports; the Battle Act (Mutual Defense Assistance and Control Act) mandating termination of aid to any country shipping arms, munitions, or any goods which could conceivably be used for military purposes to any "Soviet-dominated area". The composition of the foreign aid program for 1951-52 gives an idea of U.S. "generosity" to other lands. The total program amounted to $7.5 billion, of which $6 billion was for military aid and $1.5 billion for economic aid. On the other hand, there was a tremendous fight over whether to ship 2 million tons of grain for famine relief to India due to that country's suspicious "neutralism".

Labor and the war

During the second year of the Korean War, two trends in the labor movement noted in my earlier article continued: 1) harassment of progressive unionists; 2) a growth of pro-peace sentiment among both union leaders and rank and file workers. The first trend is exemplified by "liberal" Hubert Humphrey's advocacy of legislation to outlaw any union designated as "Communist-dominated". This legislation was aimed primarily at the 11 progressive unions expelled from the CIO in 1949-50: the UE, United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers, United Office and Professional Workers, Food Tobacco Agricultural and Allied Workers, National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, American Communications Association, International Fur and Leather Workers, the ILWU, International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, United Public Workers, and International Fishermen and Allied Workers. Humphrey's bill was supported by Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin, but was not passed because the labor hierarchy was against it, insisting that it was doing an effective job of "cleaning its own house". And labor leaders certainly were being co-operative in this respect.

For example, Walter Reuther in March 1952 finally took full control of the progressive-led 60,000-member Ford Local 600, declaring that "we will run the local from top to bottom." He couldn't do it by elections, so he did it by fiat, appointing a 6-man administrative board, abolishing the 217-man general council, and removing the 4 top officers of the local, including one of the foremost Black trade union leaders in the country, William Hood. The methods used by Reuther to gain control of Local 600 were questionable, to say the least. He invited the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to come to Detroit to investigate Communist influence among auto workers and used the climate of hysteria thus created to carry out his assault on union democracy. Another result of HUAC's visit to Detroit was, incidentally, the beginning of deportation proceedings under the McCarran Act against 53 trade unionists.

Paradoxically, at the same time as progressives continued to be hounded out of the labor movement, pro-peace sentiment was growing. The reasons were clear. While workers were caught between frozen wages and rising prices, corporations were making fantastic profits; there was serious local unemployment caused by the war-induced decline in consumer spending (during the summer of 1951, 100,000 auto workers were laid off); both direct and indirect taxes were rising; "Fair Deal" programs had been shelved due to the war; an anti-labor climate had been fostered by the Taft-Hartley Act and Truman's breaking of the steel strike; and terrorism against Blacks was on the rise. The military-industrial complex began to come under attack from labor. George Harrison, President of the AFL Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks wrote in the *Nation* (6/14/52):

> "The issue as I see it, is to check the economic royalists before they bring the world down around our ears. . . . Our own profiteers have made it possible for the Russians to argue, with increasing effect, that our paramount interest is profits at the expense of the world. Abroad there is growing mistrust. At home there is growing fear that big-business control of our rearmament program may produce a degree of counter-armament that can only end up in war."

Workers in general were realizing that they were the ones who did the suffering, both direct and indirect, in wars. The May 1952 CIO

Packinghouse Workers convention declared:

> "We, as working men and women, knowing that it is the common man, the common woman, the working men and women in factory, field or mine, who suffer first and most from the evils of war, feel that we cannot stand silently by while the nations of the world dig themselves deeper and deeper into a morass in which they render themselves helpless to prevent their own self-destruction."

Meanwhile, racketeering was a growing phenomenon in the unions, and the most corrupt were the most anti-Communist. These were the days of ascendancy for union leaders such as Dave Beck of the Teamsters, later indicted and imprisoned. This was the period when Anthony Anastasia and his goons, under the aegis of Joseph P. Ryan, ran the New York City waterfront. Not only were these men dangerous to labor in a direct sense, i.e. misusing union funds, selling out the membership in sweetheart contracts, accepting money from bosses, etc., but they provided ammunition for right-wing anti-union elements to use in curtailing union organizing. Incidentally, from 1945 to 1962, which covers the period of maximum red-baiting and racketeering in labor unions, union membership grew extremely slowly, going from 14 million to less than 17 million, from 21.9 per cent to 22.6 per cent of the labor force.

Cold War secret weapons

Repression continued to take its toll in progressive ranks. Some stood up against it and paid the price with ostracism, unemployment, jail sentences, and even death. Others gave in to it, to their shame. Meanwhile, most of the liberals who deplored the repression did not fight it by defending the right of people to be Communists, but took the much weaker ground of trying to prove that they or their friends under attack had never been involved with the Communist movement.

On 6/20/51, just prior to the start of the second year of the Korean War, 17 "second-echelon" Communists were arrested under the Smith Act. By March 1952, when their trial was to begin, the 17 could only find two lawyers willing to take their case. And during the 9 months between their arrest and trial they had consulted more than 200 attorneys. And President Truman had said in September 1951:

> "Lawyers in the past have risked the obloquy of the uninformed to protect the rights of the most degraded. Unless they continue to do so in the future, an important part of our rights will be gone."

Meanwhile, in early 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argumentes on behalf of 5 attorneys who defended the 11 Communist leaders convicted earlier under the Smith Act. These 5 were sentenced for contempt of court to jail sentences ranging from 30 days to 6 months for "overzealous" defense of their clients. Two of the five, Harry Sacher and Abraham Isserman, were disbarred from Federal practice in the Southern District of New York, Sacher for life, Isserman for two years.

There were at this time three Congressional committees investigating Communists and Communist influencee in various asepects of U.S. life. They were HUAC, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (McCarran Committee), and the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee (McCarthy Committee). They travelled all over the U.S. holding well-publicized hearings and violating the Bill of Rights. The McCarthy Committee which gained its reputation by investigating the State Department became the most famous because of his unscrupulous tactics. In August 1951 Senator William Benton of Connecticut demanded McCarthy's expulsion from the Senate for perjury and nine other charges; Benton was defeated for re-election in 1952. Many witnesses before the various committees took the Fifth Amendment (against self-incrimination) in this period, rather than the First Amendment (upholding the right of free speech). This may have weakened their position, as it implied tacit admission of the government's right to make anti-Communist laws.

The anti-Communist hysteria was fierce in 1951-52. The FBI sponsored announcements in the media such as the following:

> "Will you, as a citizen, taken ten minutes of your time to report a violation of the law

Benjamin J. Davis, Jr. (above) and Simon W. Gerson, president and executive editor respectively of the Daily Worker which supported the Korean people in their resistance to U.S. aggression.

which has come to your attention?"

The American Legion specialized in policing the motion picture industry for the political content of films and the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) in policing school textbooks. The liberal magazine the *Nation* was accused of being pro-Communist because it came out for peace in Korea, even though its columns were very critical of Communism and the USSR. Murray Kempton, liberal New York *Post* columnist, labeled all who were involved in the peace movement as Communists. Westbrook Pegler of the New York *Journal-American* demanded the immediate arrest of "thousands of New Dealers" for their "criminal connivance" with the "criminal conspiracy" of Communism.

In mid-October 1951, *Collier's* magazine published a 130-page issue projecting a hypothetical atomic war and U.S. occupation of the USSR. Features of life in the USSR after the U.S. takeover were to include a Walter Winchell column to "Mr. and Mrs. Russia", Russian editions of *Time, Life, Collier's,* and *Reader's Digest,* a production of "Guys and Dolls", Walter Reuther straightening out the labor unions, and a display of Hattie Carnegie hats in Dynamo Stadium. Contributions to this issue included liberals such as Robert E. Sherwood, J. B. Priestley, and *Christian Science Monitor* editor Erwin B. Canham, as well as diehard anti-Communists of the caliber of Hanson Baldwin, Margaret Chase Smith, Walter Winchell, and Arthur Koestler.

In the performing arts repression continued unabated. As Gail Sondergaard, peace activist and blacklisted film actress, said in a speech at the Chicago Peace Conference in June 1951:

> "If tonight I were to say to you, 'Drop the atom bomb on Moscow'—'War is inevitable'—'Draft 18-year olds', I might be permitted to return to my interrupted career as an actress. I would perhaps be permitted to appear in a picture they may soon make extolling the great humanity in the mass extermination of peoples, in putting whole populations of ungodly reds out of their misery."

Lillian Hellman told HUAC committee in a letter:

> "I am not willing, now or in the future, to bring bad trouble to people who, in my

past association with them, were completely innocent of any talk or any action that was disloyal or subversive. . . . To hurt innocent people whom I knew many years ago in order to save myself is, to me, inhuman and indecent and dishonorable. . . . I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year's fashions."

She refused to budge from her position and did not answer the committee's questions.

Along with repression of the left, racism continued to thrive. Perhaps symbolic of this period is what occurred in Cicero, Illinois in July 1951. A Black bus driver, Harvey Clark, Jr., tried to move into an apartment he had rented and a white mob attacked and wrecked the building. In October 1951, a grand jury indicted not the rioters but the owner of the building, Clark's NAACP-appointed lawyer, and three others for "conspiracy" to depreciate property values by renting to a Black person. It should be noted here that this was a period of massive Black migration to the North as Blacks were being rapidly pushed out of the rural South by agricultural mechanization and jimcrow practices which stifled their aspirations for a better life. The Cicero incident shows the kind of racist sentiment they often had to face in the "more liberal" North.



James Aronson, at the time editor of the National Guardian, a staunch opponent of the United States' war against Korea.

Meanwhile, the school desegregation fight in the South was getting under way, and there were already some court orders in Southern states ruling that Blacks be admitted to white schools. The reaction of Southern governors was predictable. Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia sponsored a law denying State funds to schools admitting Blacks, saying, "As long as I am governor, Negroes will not be admitted to white schools." James F. Byrnes of South Carolina authorized the selling or leasing of public schools to private groups to continue segregated education. Fielding L. Wright of Mississippi declared, "We shall insist upon segregation regardless of the cost or consequences."

People's resistance speeds war's end

Partly due to the massive repression visited on the Communist Party, the Progressive Party became the focus of left electoral activity in 1952. It was chaired at this time by Elmer Benson, former governor and US Senator from Minnesota, and co-chaired by Paul Robeson. Its proposed platform for 1952 was a program for struggle in all areas, including Korea, where an immediate end of the war was demanded. At its July 4, 1952 convention, the keynote speaker was to be W.E.B. DuBois and permanent chairman Vito Marcantonio.

The initial consequences of the Malik peace initiative of June 1951 could have been foreseen: the stock market and commodity futures plunged. Wall Street figured that peace would hurt corporate profits, as $46 billion in war orders were keeping most industry booming while wage controls were helping to keep costs down. War mobilization chief Wilson tried to assure the corporations by saying: "In Iran, Malaya, Indonesia and other parts of the world, danger points exist that could set the whole world aflame." In other words, Washington was telling the industrialists not to worry—even if the war in Korea might be over in the near future, war contracts would not stop, because we were in a new kind of war, a cold war, and "danger points" would always exist. The ties between the military and industry had become

closer than ever before in U.S. history.

But some industrialists were not so sure that the continuation of the war and preparations for new wars were such a blessing. These businessmen with doubts were mainly from industries whose main products were consumer durables, such as automobiles and refrigerators. They saw that Truman's rearmament program and Korea policy were hurting them because inflation, wage controls, and higher taxes were reducing consumer purchasing power and causing workers to be unable to buy "big ticket" items. A Detroit *News* editorial (1/07/51) expressed the fears of this section of the bourgeoisie:

> "The nation cannot live for long in peace, or in relative prosperity, once it is converted into an armed camp. Either it will be beggared by the cost of military upkeep, and the starving of the supply to its civilian economy will promote depression and political demoralization, or to ward off these evils, we will take the road to war, even as Hitler did."

As the war dragged on, the press began to comment more openly on the apathy and even aversion toward it felt by many people in the U.S. The *Daily Oklahoman* (9/16/51) was worried about "the persistent effort of many potential soldiers to escape military duty" and went on to comment:

> "It was not popular to try to evade military service in 1942. Apparently it is measurably popular in 1951. . . . In 1942 the people had no choice. . . . Every American knew that war had been forced on the country by a powerful enemy. . . .
>
> "But no foreign enemy has attacked the U.S. in 1951. No enemy, gun in hand, attacked the U.S. in 1950. . . . The U.S. went to war deliberately and on its own motion. And when it went to war, many, many citizens could not see any reason at all for engaging in war.
>
> ". . . Congress was never asked to approve a war declaration. Congress was sidestepped deliberately and emphatically. . . . We are fighting a major war that never has been declared officially. And millions of Americans are not in sympathy with the manner in which we were committed to the Korean conflict. In 1942 the people were confident that the war would end as soon as Japan had been defeated. . . . But in 1951 no one knows when the current war is going to end. The American people do not even know what country must be beaten before hostilities can cease."

New York advertising executive and ex-Congressman Bruce Barton wrote in *Pictorial Review* in April 1952:

> "Peace (in Truman-Pentagon language) means shooting more Chinese in Korea, more Indonesians in Indonesia, more Indo-Chinese in Indo-China and the subsidizing of war preparations everywhere in the world. . . . Today the dilemma of the US is clear and inescapable. Either 1) we go to war, or 2) we make up our minds that Russia and the US are going to exist side by side for a long time, and that we must be smart enough to accept this situation."

The activities of the organized peace movement, still led by the American Peace Crusade (APC) in the second year of the Korean War, began with its post-Chicago (American Peace Congress—Chicago, June 1950) drive: 1) efforts to get one million messages from US citizens to President Truman in favor of peace in the Far East and big power negotiations on all world problems; 2) efforts to set up peace meetings and talks; in communities all over the U.S.; 3) delegations to US and UN officials; 4) an effort to form labor peace groups in every city represented at the Chicago conference. 2600 people attended the Pennsylvania Peace Festival held in Bucks County, Pa. on 8/26/51. APC co-directors Rev. Willard Uphaus and Thomas Richardson proclaimed the week beginning 9/2/51 as "Cease Fire Week" and recommended as a minimum goal 50,000 peace messages to President Truman.

They also urged delegations and phone calls to Congressmen home during recess, motor caravans in all cities, and special activities in shops and unions. The Chicago Veterans for Peace followed up immediately with a 40-car caravan through busy downtown streets. Peace buses toured all five boroughs of New York City distributing literature, staging street corner meetings, and soliciting messages to government leaders. Other peace activities took place all over the country in early September 1951.

The APC launched a petition drive for a

"Big Five Pact" for peace on January 30, 1952. The date was chosen because January 30 was FDR's birthday. The petition received wide backing, and was aided by a list of scores of noted writers, lawyers, doctors, educators, ministers, and labor and farm leaders supporting the drive compiled by the APC. On 4/1/52, the APC sponsored a Capital Peace Assembly, where intensive lobbying took place among Congressmen.

The APC effort to enlist official spokesmen from the labor movement in its efforts for peace were less successful, due to the fear of labor leaders concerning collaboration with left groups. However, Max Awner, assistant editor of the Colorado *Labor Advocate*, official AFL paper in that state, proposed a National Peace Congress of Labor, and received support from rank and file workers.

The Truman administration in early 1952 tried to push through Congress a universal military training (UMT) bill calling for conscription of all U.S. males at age 18 for six months of basic military training (deferments limited to medical or physical reasons only) and 7½ years service in the reserves subject to call to active duty at any time. The arguments against UMT are expressed in a statement issued at the time by the National Council Against Conscription:

> "An examination of history thus leads us to the conclusion that a system which has not brought peace or security to those nations which have tried it is not likely to work differently for the U.S. Rather, the influence of the military would gradually but surely reach into every American home, church, school, and factory. Over a period of years there would be a tendency to respect the word of a general just because he is a general and a tendency to accept more and more military control over science, education, and industry. If America once submits to regimentation of its boys in peacetime, it will be difficult if not impossible to prevent the extension of the compulsory idea to other areas. . . ."

The APC, along with the National Education Association, various other organizations of educators, church groups, labor unions, and others waged a strong campaign against the bill, and it was defeated. However, an inequitable "selective service" system continued to be imposed on the nation's youth until the early 1970's, and many of the unfortunate consequences of UMT described in the above quotation have come about without UMT.

The APC and other U.S. peace groups along with Latin American peace organizations called an Intercontinental Conference for Peace, to take place in Rio de Janeiro, January 22-26, 1952. At the beginning of January Brazil refused to host the meeting. Negrão de Lima, Brazilian Minister of Justice, proclaimed the ban and said it "was Brazil's duty to her friends, notably to the U.S." The conference planners decided to move the site to Montevideo, but the Uruguayan government also refused to host the meeting. It took place there illegally anyway during the third week in March, 1952. Only a few of the scheduled delegations could get to the conference—those from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, and the U.S.

Discussed was not only the need for peace in Korea and the world as a whole, but a large number of other questions, all related to peace in its largest sense. Among these was the right of Brazil to control her own resources (specifically oil), the miserable conditions in fascist-controlled Paraguay, and the successes of the Argentine peace movement (3.2 million signatures on a peace petition and a demonstration of 50,000 workers in Rosario, after which Perón backed down from his promise to send troops to Korea).

Due to mass pressure by Uruguayan workers, the ban on the conference was rescinded a few days after it began, on condition that no nation (meaning the U.S.) be attacked by name, and an open air rally of 5000 people was held to conclude the proceedings. One of the U.S. delegates was Lorraine Hansberry, then associate editor of *Freedom* and later the author of "Raisin in the Sun". She brought with her a taped recording of Paul Robeson's greetings to the conference (Robeson was editor of *Freedom*). One of the most moving moments of the week in Montevideo occurred when Lenora Aguiar Vasquez of Argentina reported on her trip to DPRK::

> "This is not war. It is the extermination of every living, growing thing. In places

(Continued on Page 34)

(Continued from page 31)

where there could be no industry, no military target, nothing a soldier could use, there is now devastation. . . . We saw children destroyed at their mothers' breasts, children of 11 who had been raped. Defenseless villages have been machine-gunned. The women of Korea no longer raise the white flag in Korea for they expect no clemency. . . . What has happened to so quickly turn American young men into monsters?"

No description of the activities of the peace movement would be complete without mentioning W.E.B. DuBois. During the fall of 1951 he toured the US giving lectures and, typically, used the platform to talk about the world situation and not his indictment. In June of 1951, the NAACP, under nonmilitant leadership since his departure from the organization, had passed a resolution protesting the indictment at its Atlanta convention. Numerous international groups of scholars and trade unions had also made protests to the U.S. Government. These protests definitely had an effect; Dr. DuBois and his co-defendants were acquitted on November 20, 1951.

Two years after the outbreak of the Korean War, the cost to the U.S. totalled 110,000 officially admitted casualties, more than double the total number of U.S. casualties in all U.S. wars except for the Civil War and the two World Wars. The admitted cost to the average family was: cost of living up 13%; personal taxes up 25%; standard of living down 4%. Of course this was little compared to the five million casualties estimated to have been inflicted on the Koreans by this time, but it was enough to cause many in the U.S. to want to end the war as soon as possible. A substantial number would have agreed in retrospect with Vito Marcantonio's courageous words to the U.S. Congress on June 27, 1950, just as Truman was ordering U.S. intervention in Korea:

"I know that the American people will not want this action when they think it over, and I know that they will thrust through this terrible dark cloud of war that has been descending on them. You can keep on making impassioned pleas for the destruction of communism, but I tell you that the issue in China, in Asia, in Korea and in Viet Nam is the right of these peoples to self-determination, to a government of their own, to independence and national unity. These people despite the terror of the atom bomb have refused to abandon their efforts for national liberation."

The Deformation of the Economic Geography of the ROK

By ROBERT ANTE

An earlier article, "The Transformation of the Economic Geography of the DPRK," revealed that the Japanese converted the Korean peninsula into an "African style" colony. During the 1930s, in order to further their designs of military conquest against China and the Soviet Union, the Japanese imperialists transformed Korea's traditional economic geography—mainly by emphasizing certain heavy industries (metal production, the chemical industry and the electrical industry) in the northern half of the peninsula and agriculture and light industry in the southern half. From the very beginning, the economy of Korea was deformed into a supplier of raw and war materials for Japan. We have already seen how the DPRK has undertaken the creation of a balance and workable economy in her part of a divided country within the limits of her available resources. Now, we shall see how the ROK, under American military occupation and U.S. (and later Japanese) economic and political influences, has dealt with the problem of transforming the deformed economy she inherited from Japanese militarism.

The Defeat of Japan

In order to facilitate an orderly surrender of



Map #1: Provinces of the Republic of Korea.

the colonial Japanese forces in Korea, the Yalta agreement arbitrarily divided the peninsula along the parallel marking 38° North latitude. However, the general Japanese surrender occurred without the presence of American troops and by the time U.S. occupation forces arrived, a People's Republic had already been created —although only thirteen hours earlier.[1] Two months were devoted to crushing it.

The Korean people can be proud of the fact that despite the brutality of oppressive Japanese militarism, progressive forces remained viable within Korea and emerged after Japan's defeat with enough strength to mount an effective railroad strike in 1946. However, this event sparked the arrest of scores of leftist leaders, the closing of leftist newspapers, the arrest of radical union officers, and the transfer of control over the Korean Federation of Labor to Syngman Rhee.[2] The Military Government allied itself with Korean politicians closely associated with the most rightist elements of the Chinese Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek; the police who hunted down Korean patriots during the Japanese occupation ("We felt that if they did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for us"[3]); and millionaires who collaborated with the Japanese militarists.[4]

In May 1948 an election was organized by the Military Government and on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was founded. It was headed by Syngman Rhee, a man committed to the preservation of the old feudal Korea and dead set against any economic or agrarian reform.

Korea Enters the World Capitalist Market

During the course of the post-war years, the ROK government took South Korea from colonial economic isolation into the world capitalist system. This point should always be kept in mind when the improved industrial, economic, and living conditions are presented as a justification for capitalist and imperial rule. Naturally, the exploitation of South Korea's resources and people by the whole capitalist world is technologically, economically, and politically more advanced than the relatively backward conditions of colonial rule under Imperial Japan. At first, American financial interests maintained a near monopoly of South Korea's industry and trade, but in recent years, Japanese and Western European interests have gained in importance.

Major Historical Stages

Several historical periods of the economic development of Korea under the aegis of the United States and the ROK governments can be identified. From 1945 until June 1950, the occupation of South Korea by the United States and the process of counter-revolution by Syngman Rhee was carried out. Then the terrible destruction of the Korean War from June, 1950 to July 1953, followed by the militarization-colonization of South Korea. By 1958, Rhee was able to rule only through open terrorism and he was finally deposed in April 1960 and replaced by a moderate, John M. Chang, who in turn was replaced by Park Chung Hee through a military coup in May 1961 and who ultimately established a personal dictatorship.[5] Without a doubt, economic development has been more rapid under Park than under Rhee and this fact reflects the different economic attitudes that the two men represent. Park, apparently, represents forces more eager to participate in the world capitalist market as a whole, whereas Rhee, limited by anti-Japanese prejudices, favored U.S. imperialism to the exclusion of Japan. The development of South Korea's productive forces by international capital, however, does not mean that they have been developed to the best advantage of the Korean people.

Agriculture in the ROK

Under Japanese rule, the warmer southern part of the Korean peninsula was considered the region of agriculture surplus and made Korea one of the major rice exporting countries of the world. Agriculture still provides the livelihood of over half the South Korean population, but Korea is no longer a rice exporting region. Instead, today South Korea must import rice. In view of agriculture's importance to the South Korean economy, what has the ROK done to improve agricultural production and the living conditions of rural Korea?

The attitude of the American-sponsored Rhee regime was against any form of change in rural Korea, although social and political forces beyond their control forced this attitude to bend slightly. During the period of Japanese occupation, land ownership became concen-

trated into the hands of Korean landlords or large Japanese monopolies with interests in land development. Under the Japanese, landlords acquired three-fifths of Korea's farm land[6] and four-fifths of all the peasants worked on wholly or partially rented land.[7] While the Rhee regime was reluctant to carry out a land reform against the landlords (who were an important part of his political base in Korea) and thereby fundamentally alter South Korea's social structure, it did take a step backwards with respect to the land holdings of the Japanese companies. In March, 1948, about 432,000 acres of former Japanese-held land were distributed to about 600,000 peasants.[8] A large part of this land was highly organized and efficiently irrigated by large commercial enterprises and the redistribution of the land to the peasants caused it to be fragmented into smaller parcels. As a result, rice production declined somewhat. Rice production also declined because of the lack of fertilizers and the immediate loss of the Japanese market.[9]

Nevertheless, the Korean landlord class rested assured of its continued existence. Then, in 1951, most likely as a result of the political and social pressures generated by the Korean War, the ROK initiated a so-called land reform, similar to those carried out in Japan and Taiwan and attempted in South Vietnam. In this "land reform," 29 *percent* of the large land holdings (generally of the poorest quality) were sold to the peasants (for three times their value!). In principle, land ownership was to be limited to 7½ acres, yet, "in practice, tenancy has been returning. A survey by the Land Economics Research Institute indicated that 28.4 *percent* of farmers had reverted to tenancy in whole or in part by 1965."[10] Generally speaking, in contrast to the vast revolutionary changes that have taken place in the land tenure system of the DPRK, little basic change in land ownership has occurred in the ROK.

Geographical Distribution of Arable Land

The total cultivated area of the ROK, limited by mountainous topography, is about 23.5 *percent* of the total surface area of the ROK or about 3,103,414 *chongbo*.[11] The cultivated area has not changed appreciably in forty years, although South Korea has experienced a marked increase in population. Thus, the size of the average South Korean farm has been reduced from about 3 acres in the 1920s to only about 2.2 acres today.[12] Looking at the situation from another viewpoint, the ROK has only about 0.2 acre of arable land *per capita*—one of the lowest ratios in the world. This means that despite South Korea's past economic-historical record, agriculture will *never* be able to satisfy the consumption and industrial needs of the ROK's population and that the industrial sector of the economy must be developed to allow trade in order to import foodstuffs.

About three-quarters of all the ROK's arable land is found in the western and southern coastal regions. The most fertile areas are the alluvial soils which make up a third of the western plains of South Korea. However, the remaining two-thirds are the less fertile brown forest soils and, further south, the brown and red soils.

As Table I shows, the provinces with the highest ratios of cultivated land to total land area are Chungchong-namdo, Cholla-namdo, Cholla-pukdo, and Kyonggido. The lowest ratio is scored by mountainous Kangwondo. However, within the context of the ROK, discussion of the amount and distribution of cultivated land must include two additional factors: (1) irrigation, and (2) double cropping. (See Map I for the location of the various provinces.)

Distribution of Irrigated Land

Table II shows that those provinces with the highest ratios of cultivated land also lead in their share of irrigated land. About two-thirds of the cultivated land of Kyongsang-namdo (including the Pusan area) and Cholla-pukdo are irrigated, closely followed by Chungchong-namdo, Kyonggido (including the Seoul area), and Cholla-namdo. These provinces account for almost three-fourths of South Korea's irrigated land. Kangwondo has only about one third of its cultivated land irrigated (or only about 4 percent of the national total), but Chejudo has less than 2 *percent* irrigated.

However, not all of these irrigated lands are fed waters from *irrigation systems*, although in recent years this situation has been improving. Yet, as recently as 1960, about half the paddy fields were actually watered by primitive earthen structures used to hold back the

Table I: Distribution of Cultivated Land in the ROK

	Absolute amount of cultivated land (1000 A.)	*Percent of land that is cultivated*	*Percent of the Republic of Korea's cultivated land.*
Kyonggido (including the area around Seoul	791	28	14.2
Kangwondo	411	10	7.4
Chungchong-pukdo	438	23	7.9
Chungchong-namdo	722	33	12.9
Cholla-pukdo	634	31	11.4
Cholli-namdo	945	32	16.9
Kyongsang-pukdo	962	20	17.2
Kyongsang-namdo (including the area around Pusan)	686	23	12.4
Chejudo	123	–	2.2
TOTAL	5,711		102.5*

**Note total in percent column does not equal 100 be cause of rounding.*

Table II: Irrigated and Double-cropped Land in the ROK

Province	*Total cultivated Land*	*Irrigated Land*	*Percent of Province's land that is irrigated*	*Double-cropped land (1000 A.)*	*Percent of Prov. that is double-cropped*
Kyonggido (includ. Seoul area)	791	472	60	322	41
Kangwondo	411	141	34	7.3	1.8
Chungchong-pukdo	438	192	44	70	16
Chungchong-namdo	722	440	61	151	21
Cholla-pukdo	634	420	66	229	36
Cholla-namdo	945	547	58	348	36
Kyongsang-pukdo	962	522	54	341	36
Kyongsang-namdo (includ. Pusan area)	686	452	66	332	48
Chejudo	123	2.5	2	1.0	0.8
ALL ROK	5,711	3,188	56	1,512	26

rain water. At the same time, even the existing irrigation systems were admitted to be in poor technical condition, with half of the systems in need of repair. The large systems constructed by the Japanese deterioriated from lack of repairs. After years of neglect by the Rhee regime, the Park regime began to expand the irrigation network. By 1970, the percentage of fully irrigated paddy land increased to 83 *percent*. A severe draught in 1967 initiated a river basin development program that will increase the irrigated area by 300,000 acres. Bartz notes that "converting a rain-fed paddy to full and controlled irrigation increases its yield more than 80 *percent*."[13]

The watered fields are used mainly for rice. In 1966, South Korea produced 3.9 million tons of harvested rice. The major rice producer was Cholla-namdo, followed by Kyongsang-pukdo, Cholla-pukdo, Kyongsang-namdo, Chungchong-namdo, and Kyonggido. These six provinces produced four-fifths of the ROK's harvested rice.[14]

Distribution of Double Cropping.

Double cropping (the growing of two successive crops on one field during a single growing season) increases from North to South, and the province that leads in double cropping is Kyongsang-namdo. As expected, Table II shows Kangwondo trailing far behind with less than 2 *percent* of its cultivated land being double cropped. As in rural Japan and China, after the rice has been harvested, the paddy lands are drained and planted with another crop. Because of climatic limitations, the second crop is not rice but mainly barley, although wheat and legumes are common. The Naktonggang valley has a particularly high percentage of paddy fields that are double cropped.



Map #2: Fuel and energy resources of the ROK.

In Kyonggido and several other places, vegetables are often planted on the fields before they are flooded with rice.

According to Table II, almost 45 percent of the ROK's cultivated land is made up of dry fields (about 2,523,000 acres). The largest amount of dry-field land is located in the provinces of Kyongsang-pukdo, Cholla-namdo, and Kyonggido, which contain about half of the dry fields of South Korea. Land pressure is severe enough to bring the dry fields into intensive use and three-quarters of the dry fields are double-cropped.[15] The dry fields are planted to various combinations of barley, potatoes, beans, maize, tobacco, fruits, vegetables and mulberry.

Modernization of South Korea's Agriculture

The fundamental agrarian problem facing the rulers of the ROK is how to modernize the traditional agrarian system while retaining its essential features, *i.e.* how to introduce change without actually changing. During the Park regime this has been attempted by the creation of large scale irrigation projects and the rearrangement of paddy fields, increased use of fertilizers, and new strains of rice, *e.g.* the so-called green revolution.

Large scale construction projects have been launched such as "the construction of additional reservoirs, drilling of deep wells, and the building of a 40 mile canal . . . to carry water from the Chilbo dam on the Somjin westward to reclaimed land in the Puan-Sochang area."[16] A large flood-control project on the Namgang (a tributary of the Naktonggang)—conceived in 1925 but not completed until 1969—is a large multi-purpose project that will not only supply water irrigation, but will also supply water to the cities of Chinju and Samchonpo, plus hydroelectricity.[17] In 1971, work began on a large dam at Andong on the Naktonggang with a storage capacity

Overall Economic Indicators for North and South Korea

Estimate of NI* Per Capita 1970 (US Dollar)	North Korea	South Korea
Annual average growth rates (per cent)	375	110
National Income or GNP 1954-1962	22.1	4.7
National Income or GNP 1961-1970	8.9	9.3
Gross Industrial Output 1954-1970 (71)	23.5	15.3
Gross Agricultural Output 1954-1960	10.0	2.7
Gross Agricultural Output 1961-1970	6.3	4.4

* Adjusted to socialist definition. For exchange rates see test

Table III: Agricultural Production in the ROK: 1947-1971

	1947[1]	1948[1]	1949[1]	1950[1]	1951[1]	1952[1]	1953[1]	1959[2]	1966[3]	1967[3]	1968[3]	1969[3]	1970[3]	1971[3]
Rice (1000 metric tons)	2111	2361	2284	2264	1759	1439	2191	3260	3919	3603	3195	4090	3939	3998
Wheat & Barley (1000 metric tons)	520	548	708	731	426	611	721	118[6] 820[7]	2,372[8]	2253	2453	2459	2352	2197
Other grains (1000 metric tons)	60	80	116	72	96	154	83	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Miscellaneous grain	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	407	114	162	137	124	–
Pulses	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	195	235	288	273	277	263
Potatoes	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	972	613	759	778	783	–
Fruits	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	331	359	392	417	423	–
Vegetables	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1717	1869	2150	2428	2520	–

[6]wheat
[7]barley
[8]Martynov gives: wheat 315,000 tons; barley over 2 million tons. p. 177. Figures from 1966 to 1971 are for barley only.

Source: [1]Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage: a regional and social geography* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956), pp. 230-231.
[2]*Welthandbuch*, pp. 743-744.
[3]*Korea Annual*, p. 171
[4]Figure refers to polished rice.
[5]Bartz gives a figure of 4,100 for rice.



May #3: Mining and metallurgy in the ROK.

of one billion cubic meters plus a 76,000 kilowatt generating capacity.[18]

The rearrangement of paddy fields can produce a noticeable amelioration of South Korea's agricultural situation. Today in South Korea an average of six family members must exist on tiny farms of little more than 0.7 acre. In addition to their small size, these tiny farms are fragmented kaleidoscope fashion into smaller plots. In the ROK there are generally about six plots per land holding, but frequently the number can reach as high as seventeen. Often 2,000 individual fields are squeezed into one square mile of land. Land fragmentation reduces the productivity of the peasant in a number of ways, for example: (1) a loss of time in travelling from one isolated plot to another for the purposes of cultivation, (2) a loss of land due to the space occupied by land boundaries and footpaths, (3) the inability to provide adequate irrigation, (4) the inability to match soil characteristic with optimal seed and crop varieties because the farmer with such tiny land holdings is incapable of farming a variety of seeds or crops. The elimination of land fragmentation by paddy rearrangement increases crop production by permitting better coordination in irrigation, insect spraying and other agrotechniques. By 1969, about one-tenth of the paddies (135,000 changbo)[19] had been reassembled. This program is planned ultimately to include half of the total paddy land. The fact that the rearrangement of paddy fields is done with heavy earth moving equipment also provides excellent opportunities for profiteering and graft, and thereby is a suitable technique for South Korea.

One consequence of South Korea's backward agriculture and industry has been the lack of sufficient use of chemical fertilizers. Only in the last decade has the ROK produced a quantity of artificial fertilizers. The result has been the destruction of the soil structure and declining fertility.[20] At present about 89 lbs/ac. are applied to the paddy lands,[21] although some geographers believe that the fields require about 270 lbs/ac.[22] Nevertheless, as we shall see, the use of fertilizers should increase in the future. Yet, one can ask why the ROK, supported by the huge financial resources of the USA, did not promulgate the extensive use of fertilizers much earlier.

'Miracle rice,' I.R. 677, has also been introduced into the ROK in order to begin a "green revolution." This rice is said to increase yields by at least 30 *percent* and experimentation has begun already.[23]

At the same time, in contrast to the DPRK, mechanization is poorly developed. Small hand motor tillers, similar to those successfully introduced into Japan, have increased from only 1,000 in 1965 to about 9,000 in 1968 and an expected 70,000 by 1976.[24] But the ROK has several *million* farm households! These land tractors cost about $275 each, or more than the farmer's annual income. The ROK had only about 100 small 30-50 h.p. tractors in 1968. These cost about $820 each. Obviously, the mechanization of agriculture in the ROK has a long, long way to go!

What effects have the rural policies of the Park regime had upon the agricultural devel-

Table IV: Structure of Industry in the ROK: 1969

	Workers		Value Added	
	Number	Percent of total	Million won	Percent of total
Mining	72,821	8.0	27,841	6.1
Metallurgy	29,066	3.2	17,049	3.8
Metalworking	137,600	15.2	59,802	13.2
Chemical (including the rubber industry)	77,274	8.6	59,622	13.1
Furniture & woodworking	46,304	5.1	14,798	3.2
Paper	17,672	1.9	10,251	2.3
Food	89,891	10.0	61,747	13.6
Textiles & apparel (including shoes)	271,587	30.1	78,926	17.3
Petroleum & Coal products	13,858	1.5	34,134	7.5
Non-metallic mineral products	49,924	5.5	25,896	5.8
Other light industry	95,868	10.9	63,816	14.1

Table based upon a table in Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ROK *Statistical Yearbook 1971*, cited by Batrz, p. 84

opment of the ROK? As Table III shows, although the major crops demonstrate noticeable yearly fluctuation, rice made appreciable increases in production during the past decade.

Rice. Rice is by far the major crop in the ROK. In terms of traditional agricultural technologies, Korean agriculture has long been successful, and current yields (2,910 lbs/ac) are twice the unit area yields of India or Thailand, although less than Japan.[25] But neglect of the rural economy during the Syngman Rhee and the American occupation carried yields below those of the Japanese occupation. The pre-World War II high in 1937 was about 3 million tons,[26] but through 1953 the best year was 1948, with only 2.36 million tons. Only in 1958 did Korea exceed the pre-war production of polished rice.[27] With the exception of the draught year of 1967, recent production of polished rice has hovered around 4 million tons.[28]

Barley. Barley is the second most important crop in the ROK. In 1971, about 2 millions tons of barley was produced,[29] mainly from the provinces of Cholla-namdo, Kyongsang-namdo, Kyongsang-pudko, and Cholla-pudko. Cholla-namdo alone produces one-fourth of all the ROK's barley.[30] On Cheju island malt barley is grown.[31] Barley production has increased significantly from the 820,000 tons produced in 1959.[32]

Wheat. Wheat is cultivated mainly in the provinces of Kyongsang-pudko, Kyongsang-namdo, and Cholla-namdo. Although wheat production has been increasing (from 118,000 tons in 1959 to 315,000 tons in 1966), it is still a minor crop grown as a winter crop on the dry fields and the drained paddies.

Soyabeans. Soyabeans are an important crop in the ROK, especially in the provinces of Kyongsang-pudko, Kyonggido, and Chungchong-namdo. The 1966 harvest was 161,000 tons.[33] Soyabeans are grown as an important element in the crop rotation system, but yields are still low and production has not increased significantly.

Other food crops worth mentioning are dry rice (49,000 tons in 1966), especially in Cholla-pukdo, Cholla-namdo, and Kyonggido; millet in Kyongsang-pudko, Cholla-namdo, and Kangwondo; sorghum from Kyonggido; and maize from Kongwondo.

Despite limited advances made under the Park regime, the long neglect of agriculture under the Rhee regime together with present-day backwardness in applied agricultural technology in the ROK means that the ROK must still import significant amounts of grains. Wheat and rice along with cotton remain the dominating imports from the USA, mainly under the P.L. 480 programs.[34] While the small amount of arable land may preclude the ROK's total independence from foreign sources of grain, sufficient advances in the rural economy could diminish this dependence.

Technical crops have always had an important place in the agricultural economy of South Korea. For example, the Japanese preparing for further military conquests, expanded the areas of cotton production. While some contraction of the area devoted to cotton would perhaps be expected after Japan's defeat, when the country's economy *should have been* reorganized to meet domestic needs, the *actual situation* appears to reflect the ROK's subservience to U.S. business interests. Between 1956 and 1966, cotton production dwindled by four times to only 14,000 tons.[35] Cotton "is now grown for household use in quilts and padded winter clothing."[36] The main reason for the decline in Korea's domestic production is the influx of raw cotton from the U.S.A.—one of its three major agricultural exports to the ROK. About half of the ROK's own cotton production is from Cholla-namdo.

Silk cocoon raising has been increasing in the last decade and the acreage devoted to mulberry trees tripled between 1961 and 1970.[37] The ROK ranks fourth in world production after Japan, China, and the USSR.

A little hemp and rami production round out the picture on fibers.

Other notable agricultural products are *ginseng*, produced especially on Kanghwa *island* (Kyonggido), which provides annual exports of $10 million, and *tobacco*, produced in the hill lands of Chungchong-pukdo, Chungchong-namdo and northern Kyongsang-pudko. Today the ROK is an important producer of Virginia tobacco.

South Korea is also an intensive producer of fruits, especially apples (170,000 tons *per*

annum), pears (40,000 tons), and peaches (20,000 tons). The main areas of production are Kyongsang-pudko, Kyonggido, Kyongsang-namdo and Chungchong-namdo.

The economic geography of agriculture in South Korea reflects the impact of imperialism in several ways. First, because truly fundamental changes and improvements in the rural areas require revolutionary changes in the socio-economic relationships existing in the rural areas, the peasants have been suppressed politically. Second, certain crops (such as cottion) have been eliminated to provide a market for U.S. surplus agricultural production. Third, generally speaking, agriculture is not the most lucrative sector for foreign investments. Nevertheless, some change has occurred. Under the Rhee regime, the rural economy deteriorated. However, because the rural economies in many of the developing countries and socialist countries are experiencing various degrees of revolutionary change accompanied by improved living conditions and rational agricutural policies, some improvements in South Korea's agriculture had to be made to insure 'stability.' Needless to say, the proximity of the DPRK and the vast changes that have occurred in the rural economy of the northern part of the peninsula are a powerful deterrent to the Park regime remaining totally unresponsive to production needs within the agricultural sector. Some gestures towards change have been carried out. Nevertheless, despite the existence of 'model villages,' unlike the DPRK, few villages are supplied with electricity and, as one peasant said, "we don't have any farm machines yet. We still do our work with hand tools."[38] As the *New Times* reported, "The economic progress that is so evident in Seoul is hardly visible here (in rural Korea)."[39]

Furthermore, an "unstable" agrarian situation aggravates investment opportunities in the industrial sector. Therefore, the ROK, under the "business oriented" Park, who rules through his henchman Lee Hu-rak, head of the Korean CIA,[40] some attention has been given to ameliorating some of the problems facing the rural areas, *i.e.* the improvement of irrigation water supplies, new seed strains, etc. Yet, for the majority of South Korea's peasants, these are only empty gestures.

Industry in the ROK

The industrial sector reflects the political and economic dependence of the ROK on the U.S.A. This dependence is reflected by the deformed industrial structure of the country (see Table IV). Notice that the ROK lacks certain vital industrial sectors necessary for industrial development such as machine-building while it is topheavy in textile production. The distribution of industrial activities in the ROK also exhibits a deformed spatial distribution. The following remarks will demonstrate that after a period of relative stagnation under Rhee, the Park regime has undertaken the creation of

Table V: Principal Mineral Production in the ROK

Item	Unit	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971[1]
Anthracite	1000MT	11,613	12,436	10,242	10,273	12,394	12,785
Iron ore (50% Fe)	1000MT	807	694	842	734	599	442
Tungsten (70% Wo)	ST	4,029	4,012	4,298	3,847	4,032	4,018
Mangenese ore (40% Mn)	MT	–	–	3,437	2,315	2,397	2,134
Silver (100% Ag)	KG	1,882	1,968	1,708	1,465	1,366	947
Gold (100% Au)	KG	15,554	18,285	18,992	19,584	26,322	46,769
Copper ore (4% Cu)	MT	21,073	15,555	18,616	19,285	18,772	14,638
Lead ore (40% Pb)	MT	13,891	17,607	23,312	24,005	26,379	26,453
Bismuth unwrought (99% Bi)	MT	97	110	105	111	106	97
Crystalline graphite (80%)	MT	2,160	2,426	634	593	795	1,172
Amorphous graphite (75%)	1000MT	128	364	359	310	338	374
Kaolin SK35	MT	105,740	102,679	60,513	52,983	84,608	124,445
Talc	MT	53,610	56,283	64,761	130,915	135,338	105,374
Fluorite (90% CaF)	MT	32,008	56,968	37,482	24,177	29,978	50,815
Pyrophyllite	MT	54,690	66,592	91,147	69,923	93,995	91,014

[1] Preliminary figures.

Source: *Korean Annual*, p. 172.

the infrastructure necessary for the exploitation of the natural resources and labor of South Korea by foreign monopolies. Indeed, while the creation of this infrastructure does, at times, provide certain benefits to the people of South Korea, the monopolies of the U.S.A. and Japan have attempted to create a Korea in the Southern half of the peninsula that meets the needs of foreign monopoly capital, while ignoring the needs of the Korean people –except when a response to these needs will increase monopoly profits.

Fuel and Energy Base

An unfortunate result of the creation of two separate Korean states was the isolation of the ROK from the energy base initially developed by the Japanese in the area now occupied by the DPRK. Coal deposits located in the ROK are not the most economically favorable, although neglect by the ROK has only exasperated the fuel situation in South Korea. As in North Korea, most of the coal is anthracite.

It is estimated that the ROK has 325 million tons of coal.[41] Most of the ROK's coal deposits are deep, requiring more costly underground mining methods. In total, South Korea has over 200 mines in operation but apparently only 13 are large mines: 8 government-owned mines and 5 privately owned. The remainder are small.[42] The government-owned mines account for two-fifths of the ROK's production.[43]

Most of these coal reserves are located in Kangwondo and almost 90 percent of the coal produced comes from Kangwondo and the adjacent areas of Kyongsang-pudko. (See Map 2.)

The Chongsong mine produces about 2 million tons *per annum* or about one quarter of South Korea's production. Unfortunately, the crumbly nature of the coal plus inefficient mining techniques cause much of the coal to remain in the earth.

Second place in coal production is held by the Tanyang mine, about 25 miles southwest of the Chongsong mine. The same coal bed is mined at Hambaek. Annual production at Tanyang is 900,000 tons and at Hambaek about 300,000 tons. These mines, plus one about 12 miles north of the Tanyang and another at Togye, which exploit the Samchok deposits produce two-thirds of the ROK's coal.

Despite their folded and faulted beds, and friable character, the heat content of South Korean coals are respectable. The problem is primitive mining methods, using picks, shovels, and wheelbarrows. Although the U.S.A. spent about $160 million to improve the energy situation in South Korea, these monies went mainly to military uses and the debts of the state coal enterprises. In recent years, foreign interests have recognized the need for an improved fuel base in order to more efficiently exploit the country and therefore the goal at the end of the Third Five Year Plan is 17 million tons compared with 10 million tons in 1966.[44]

Coal is also mined at the Hwasun mine in Cholla-namdo (500,000 tons *per annum*) and at the coastal area near Taejon in Chungchong-namdo.

Despite South Korea's inadequate fuel supply, about 300,000 tons *per annum* is exported to Japan.[45] Most of the coal used in South Korea is converted into Korean-style briquettes for domestic heating and cooking (81 percent), while only a much smaller share is used for generating power (11 percent) or manufacturing (8 percent).[46] As Table V shows, each year South Korea mines over 10 million tons of coal, yet the extraction and distribution of coal are inadequate even to satisfy the demands for domestic fuel, with the result that fire-wood is commonly used, leading to deforestation and subsequent erosion of the land and deterioration of agricultural potential. Thus, imbalances in the development of an industrial sector have a direct impact upon agriculture.

Petroleum

South Korea lacks known petroleum resources, yet, unlike the DPRK, which has developed her particular endowment of natural resources for energy production, the ROK is transferring her power base from coal to petroleum.[47] For example, railroads were converted from coal to Diesel engines by 1969.[48] The ROK must import crude petroleum from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at a cost of $174 million *per annum*.[49] Meanwhile, the international monopolies have already grabbed the exploratory rights for Korea's potential offshore petroleum.

The end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s are marked by ever increasing refining capacities. By the end of 1971, total national capacity was 275,000 barrels a day. At present

Table VI: Major Electrical Stations in the ROK Hydroelectric Stations

Name of station	Estimated Capacity (1000 kw)	Location
Soyang (est. completion end 1972)	200	
Hwachon	108	Kangwondo
Paldang (under construction)	80	Kyonggido
Chunchon	58	Kyonggido
Uiam	45	
Chongpyong	40	Kyonggido
Chilbo	29	Cholla-pukdo
Chinju	13	
Kwisan	3	Chungchong-pukdo
Posong	4	Cholla-namdo
Un-am	2	Cholla-pukdo
Thermal stations		
Pusan	132	Pusan
Nengwol No. 1	100	Yongwol City
Nengwol No. 2	100	Yongwol City
Kangnung (under construction)	100	Kangnung
Masan	54	Nasan
Samchok	50	Samchok
Seoul	60	Seoul
Kwangju	12	Kwangju
Yosu (3 plants under const.)	1,100	Yosu
Ulsan (2 plants under const.)	800	Ulsan
Inchon (3 plants under const.)	826	Inchon
Pusan (under construction)	564	Pusan

there are three petroleum refineries: one, at Ulsan,[50] with a capacity of 115,000 barrels a day, is a "joint venture" between the government[51] and Gulf Oil initiated in 1964 (future capacity is a planned 175,000 barrels a day); a second, at Yosu,[52] with a capacity of 100,000 barrels a day opened as a joint venture between Korean capitalists[53] and Caltex in 1969; and a third at Inchon,[54] with a capacity of 60,000 barrels a day intended to supply local thermal-electric plants, is a joint venture with Union Oil of the U.S.A.[55] Capacity at the end of 1972 is anticipated to reach 395,000 barrels a day.[56] Not only are these ventures profitable to the international petroleum monopolies, but in 1970, 70 *percent* of Korea's petroleum exports went for military use in South Vietnam.[57] By the end of 1973, the reduction in petroleum production by South Korea's major suppliers as a result of the Middle East situation caused severe fuel and energy shortages. It is estimated that industry and transportation would suffer a 17 *percent* cut in petroleum supplies and that, if prolonged, this would erode the rapid gains of the GNP during the previous year. Such are the insecurities of the capitalist world.

Production of Electricity

The lack of balanced, modern industrial and agricultural development is reflected by the poorly developed electroenergy industry. However, neither the postwar separation from the electric power resources of the DPRK (destroyed during the Korean War) nor poverty of fuel resources can adequately explain this situation. This is made especially evident now, when the ROK is busily creating the electroenergy infrastructure for the modern exploitation of Korean labor by the foreign monopolies.

In 1966, the ROK's installed electro-energy capacity was only 769,000 kw, or about 0.03 kw per capital,[58] compared with 2.2 million kw by 1971. Still, by the end of 1969, only 64.3 *percent* of the urban households and 24.1 *percent* of the rural households had electricity.[59] By 1976, half of the rural areas of the ROK is expected to have electricity.[60] Of course, all of the rural households in the DPRK are supplied with electricity.

Only about 18 *percent* of South Korea's electricity is produced by hydo-stations.[61] The largest of these is the Hwachon station on the North Han river[62] near Chunchon, with a ca-



Map #4: Major manufacturing centers in the ROK.

pacity of 103,000 kw (see Map 2 and Table VI). The Chunchon dam, located eight miles from Chunchon city on the Soyanggang river has a capacity of 58,000 kw.[63] Just below Chunchon is the Ulam dam, with a capacity of 45,000 kw.[64] In Konggido on the Hangang near Seoul, the Chongpyong station has a capacity of 40,000 kw. These stations produce most of the ROK's hydo-electricity. In the southwestern part of Korea are the Chilbo (29,000 kw) and Un-am (2,000 kw) stations. Most of the other stations are small. Near Chinju on the Namgang a station was completed in 1969 with a capacity of 12,600 kw.[65] New or planned construction includes: a 200,000 kw capacity station on the Soyang near Chunchon; a 64,000 kw capacity station on the Kum at Yongdam, and a 80,000 kw capacity station on the Hangang at Paldang, 15 miles from Seoul.[66]

Most of the ROK's electricity is produced by thermal stations. These stations can be divided into two groups: those operating on local fuels and those operating on imported petroleum.

Among the large thermal stations operating on Korean anthracite is the Pusan thermal station constructed by General Electric from loans to the ROK, with a capacity of 132,000 kw. Fuel costs are increased since coal briquettes are made at Samchok and sent by sea to Pusan.[67] Two other stations constructed with foreign capital and fueled by local anthracite mines are at Yongwol, each with 100,000 kw capacities.[68] Another station with a 100,000 kw capacity is under construction near Yongwol. Other plants are also planned.

Despite the availability of Korean fuels such as coal, the greatest expansion of electro-energy production in the ROK is among thermal stations operating on oil-burning plants operating on imported petroleum. These include the 54,000 kw capacity shoreline Samil Electric Plant at Masan,[69] the 50,000 kw station at Samchok (where anthracite is mined!),[70] and a 60,000 kw station at Seoul.[71]

Newer and larger oil-burning stations are being constructed at Yosu, where two plants will generate 1,100,000 kw, at Ulsan, where two plants will generate 800,000 kw, and at Inchon, where three plants will generate 826,000 kw.[72]

Even a nuclear power plant is under construction at Pusan, capacity of 564,000 kw.[73]

The above remarks justify the assumption that South Korea's energy base is not being developed wholly in the interest of a rational economic development policy. Rather, their coastal location and orientation away from local fuels toward imported petroleum indicate a policy of energy development more in the interests of foreign petroleum monopolies.

Mining and Metallurgy

The export of mineral products rapidly increased from only $14.7 millions in 1960 to $47.2 millions in 1971 (including coal). Metallic and non-metallic minerals (excluding coal, salt and building materials) employ about 2.3 *percent* of all South Korea's workers, mainly in some 1,000 small and primitive operations. Since smelting facilities are lacking, the minerals leave as ores and minerals account for one-eighth of the ROK's exports. As a result of an American directed geological survey, South Korea's mineral base was considerably widened.

Precious metals. Formerly, Korea was a producer of gold for the Japanese. Today gold has declined to about 1 ton *per annum.* On the other hand, silver has increased from about 20 tons in 1969 to about 47 tons in 1971.[74] The major mines for the extraction of precious metals are the Ansong gold and silver deposits in Konggido, the Kubong and Changhang deposits in Chungchong-namdo, the Chongyang deposits in Chungchong-namdo, and the Muguk mine in Chungchong-puko.[75] About half of the production is from the Changhang, Kubong, and Muguk mines.[76] These mines have not followed wise conservation techniques, concentrating only on the high-grade ores and then abandoning the deposits.[77] (See Map 3).

The gold and silver are refined at the Changhang refinery, established by the Japanese in 1936 and now government owned. Copper is also refined here. In fact, "all nonferrous metallic minerals, other than zinc, must, by law, be sent to this government refiner."[78] A new refinery is being built at Masan with a capacity of 15,000 tons of various nonferrous metals. Almost all the gold is shipped out to cover the ROK's enormous foreign debts.[79]

Copper-gold-silver ores are also mined. The largest deposit is at Kwangyang, followed by Chinju in Kyongsang-namdo. About half of South Korea's copper is mined from a copper-tungsten ore at Dalsong in Kyongsang-pukdo. Previously most of this ore was exported, but today the export of copper ores is prohibited.[80]

The U.S.A. has a particular interest in the tungsten deposits of South Korea, because of this metal's military value. Besides the numerous copper-tungsten ores, scheelite (a tungsten mineral), along with molybdenum and bismuth is mined at Sangdong. South Korea produces about 4,000 tons of tungsten concentrate (Wo: 70%), or about 10 percent of the world's production.

Lead and zinc ores are mined at two deposits: lead mainly at Sihung (10% lead, 4% zinc) and zinc mainly at Ponghwa (7% lead, 4-13% zinc). Despite their economic importance, the mining operations are primitive. A large part is exported, mainly as concentrates.

Besides some nickel production near Chongju in Chungchong-pukdo and some tin at Samchung, about 30 miles west of Ulchin, the mining of radio-active ores near Kunsun should be mentioned.

Ferrous mining and metallurgy. The province of Kangwondo contains 80 *percent* of the ROK's iron ore reserves. The main centers of iron ore production are the Yanguang mines near Sokcho and the Simhwa mines at Pukpyong near Samchok. These centers produce about a third of South Korea's iron ore production. The Daihan mines at Yangyang, which produce about 200,000 tons per annum of 60 *percent* enriched ore, were sold to private interests by the government in 1967, and their production is exported to Japan *via* Sokcho.

In 1965, two new iron ore mines were constructed: one at Mulgam in Kangwondo, the other at Kyangi (exploiting the Kwachu deposits). Iron ore is also mined at Chungju and Okchon, standing third in production after Kangwondo and Kyongsang-pukdo.[81] There are numerous small mines which produce irregularly according to Japanese needs. The erratic character of the iron mining industry (See Table V) is illustrated by the fact that the 1971 production was only 55 *percent* of that of 1968.

Besides iron, another ferrous metal produced in South Korea is manganese. The largest manganese deposits are at Chunyang in Kyongsang-pukdo and Chonan in Kangwondo. Almost all of the manganese is exported but production has declined from 4,300 tons (at 40% Mn content) in 1965 to only 2,134 tons in 1971.

At present the ROK lacks an integrated full-cycle steel works. Inchon has a modest production using furnaces and imported ore, as well as producing some rolled steel. There is a modest ensemble of rolling mills, especially in the industrial Yongdungpo suburb of Seoul. Apparently a large integrated plant was planned for Samchonpo, but it has not materialized. However, construction has begun on a large iron and steel complex at Pohang, on the east coast, close to iron ore, limestone, and imported scrap. Already production capacity has increased from 48,000 tons of pig iron, 322,000 tons of steel, and 648,000 tons of rolled steel in 1964, to 203,000 tons, 853,000 tons, and 1,412,000 tons respectively in 1970.[82] Thus, the ratios for steel capacity from pig iron to steel to rolled steel improved from 1:6.7:13.5 to 1:4.2:7. These ratios mean that South Korea's domestic iron and steel industry is meeting more of the needs for domestic rolled steel. Steel production is envisaged to increase from 1,276,000 tons in 1970 to 3,589,000 tons in 1976.[83]

Metalworking Industries

The machine-building industry hardly exists in South Korea, although there are a few large companies producing mining, construction, textile, and printing machines. Most of the ROK's metalworking industry is in small semi-handicraft concerns employing fewer than fifty people.

During and after the Korean War, scattered throughout the ROK were innumerable small shops that assembled automobiles from discarded parts. Today, a number of foreign automobile monopolies have assembly plants in the ROK. These companies supply parts and technicians. Toyota (Nissan Motors) assembles automobiles and trucks at Pupyong, near Seoul. Buses and Kaiser Jeeps are assembled at Pusan, while British Ford produces automobiles, buses, and trucks at Ulsan, Fiat assembles autos at Kwangju, Cholla-lamdo, Honda produces

trucks and motor-bikes. Automobile and Diesel motors are assembled at Pusan (Toyota) and Inchon.

Korea is also used as a cheap labor source for assembling sewing machines, radios, TVs, electronic parts, fluorescent light, etc. for export, mainly to the U.S.

The present ROK government intends to modernize the machine-building industry by loans, which will only aggravate South Korea's difficult international financial situation.

The Chemical Industry

As pointed out above, one of the factors responsible for South Korea's agricultural stagnation was the shortage of artificial fertilizers and chemical weed killers. For a long time only two small works at Samchok and Inchon produced fertilizers. In 1965, work began on chemical fertilizer plants in Chungju and Naju in Cholla-namdo. The Japanese firm Mitsui Bussan made the ROK a loan for the construction of one of two fertilizer plants based upon petroleum by-products at Ulsan,[84] where a petrochemical complex is being constructed by the international monopolies, including Gulf, Skelly, Dow, Siemens, and Ford. Another fertilizer plant is at Chinhae and a sixth is under construction at Chungju. In 1970, South Korea produced only 720,000 tons of urea fertilizer.[85]

The production of small amounts of industrial chemicals (caustic soda, calcium, sulphuric acid, etc.) is concentrated at Samchok.

Pharmaceuticals, rubber shoes, plastics, and vinyl are produced in the Seoul-Inchon area, as well as in Pusan, Chungju, and Taegu.

The completion of synthetic textile plants at Ulsan, based upon imported raw materials and the petro-chemical industry being developed there, is an important development for South Korea's textile industry. The recent petroleum shortage created a severe shortage of polyesters produced from petroleum refined in South Korea as well as imported polyesters from Japan.

Cement was in sufficient shortage to attract American and West German capital. Furthermore, a local supply of cement was necessary in order to construct other foreign enterprises as well as the local infrastructure. American capital enlarged existing cement plants at Mungyong and Samchok, as well as constructing three large cement factories and a carbide plant at Tanyang. In 1964, German capital built what is allegedly the largest cement plant in the Far East–the Sanyang Cement Plant at Pukpyong near Mukho and Samchok with a capacity of 1,700,000 tons. Other plants are at Yongwol, Chechon, and Seoul. These plants use limestone from south Kangwondo. The consumption of cement increased from 587.000 tons in 1960 to 6.4 million tons in 1969 an an expected 13 million tons in 1976.[86] Production was still lagging behind consumption by about 1.6 million tons at the end of the 1960s, but now can produce for export.[87]

Paper also attracted American and West German businessmen. Divorced from the wood and timber resources of the DPRK, paper works were constructed at Seoul, Taejon, Pusan, Taegu, and Anyang, using American, German, and Japanese equipment and imported pulp. The production of newsprint increased from 26,900 tons in 1960 to 103,100 tons in 1970.[88]

Plywood, with exports valued at $66 million in 1968, exceeds the value of textile exports. Production increased from 187,000 sq. meters in 1960 to 2,872,000 sq. meters in 1970. The Korean plywood industry depends upon imported lumber from the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan. The largest plywood plant in the world is at Pusan. Other plywood centers are at Inchon and Kunsan.

Textile Industry

The major employer in South Korea is the textile industry. About 30 *percent* of the ROK's workers are employed in the textile and apparel industries. In Taegu and Pusan, where about two-fifths of all workers are in textiles, the textile and apparel industries are by far the dominant employers. The systematic destruction of South Korea's cotton raw material base by foreign interests was already discussed above.

The cotton fabric industry has been expanding rapidly and dominates the South Korean textile industry, although today cotton is challenged by synthetic textiles. The production of cotton yarn increased from 49,100 lbs in 1960 to 71,900 lbs in 1970.[89] In 1970, about 186 million sq. meters of cotton cloth were produced. Although small enterprises are scattered throughout the country, about two-thirds of the cotton industry is located in the cities of Seoul,

Inchon, Taegu, Kwangju, and Pusan.

Plants using artificial fibers have been constructed in Seoul and Pusan. A plant using a mixture of cotton and Japanese synthetic fibers was established by a British firm in Seoul.[90] Unfortunately, the production of synthetics has been erratic. For example, the production of rayon was more than halved between 1967 (65 million sq. meters) and 1971 (35 million sq. meters)[91] in spite of optimistic forecasts.[92]

Under the Japanese, Korea was a producer of raw silk. As noted above, raw silk production has recovered and although three-quarters of it is still exported, the remainder is made into cloth–mainly at Chongju, Taegu, Kwangju, Seoul, and Taejon. Small amounts of woolens are also produced.[93]

Korea produces cheap textile goods for the world market. However, a significant part of its production is for U.S. Army uniforms destined for distribution in South East Asia. South Korea's textiles are exported to the U.S.A., Japan, Britain, and West Germany. However, South Korean textile exports may face difficult times since the United States has established textile quotas. The estimated loss to Korea is $325 million over the next five years.[94]

Food Industry

The food industry employs about 10 *percent* of the Korean workers, but, except for Pusan, Chongju, and Seoul, they work in widely distributed, primitive enterprises. Foreign capital has constructed large flour mills in Pusan, Inchon, and Seoul. The fishing industry is hampered by the lack of refrigeration facilities due to the lack of electricity. However, Japanese capital has been active in improving this sector of South Korea's economy.

Economic Regions of the ROK

On the basis of the above presentation three major economic regions can be recognized: the Kyonggi-Kangwondo region, the Central region, and the South-Eastern region.

The Kyonggi-Kangwondo region has an area of about 10,800 sq. miles and a population of about 7 million. This region contains South Korea's mineral wealth: coal, iron ore, molybdenum, gold, silver, copper, lead, graphite, *etc.*, and the largest tungsten deposits in the world. The main industrial centers are the Seoul-Inchon area (with a third of the country's large-scale enterprises, but especially light industry–mainly textiles and food) and Samchok (specializing in the chemical, metallurgical, and construction industries). The hilly topography confines agriculture to the valley bottoms, especially in the western part of the region.

The Central region includes the provinces of Chungchong-pukdo, Chungchong-namdo, Chola-pukdo, Cholla-namdo and Kyongsang-pukdo and is the most densely populated part of the ROK, with 60 *percent* of its territory but 70 *percent* of its population. Mainly of an agricultural character, the chief agricultural areas are in the western and southern parts of the region. The major crop is rice, and also barley, soya beans, other grains, cotton, silk, and hemp. There are also important iron, copper, and gold

Table VII: Population and Households (as of October 1970 population census)

Province	Number of Persons	Percent of total Population	Number of Males	Number of Females	Number of Households
Seoul	5,509,993	17.5	2,750,952	2,759,041	1,091,015
Pusan	1,878,785	6.0	939,967	938,818	371,992
Kyonggido	3,361,730	10.6	1,687,362	1,674,368	641,281
Kangwondo	1,873,908	6.0	960,632	913,276	352,493
Chungchong-pukdo	1,483,153	4.7	755,041	728,112	262,184
Chungchong-namdo	2,863,686	9.1	1,447,427	1,415,959	500,276
Cholla-pukdo	2,433,819	7.7	1,215,400	1,218,419	427,332
Cholla-namdo	4,009,236	12.7	2,013,364	1,995,872	703,932
Kyongsang-pukdo	4,564,572	14.5	2,287,484	2,277,088	850,301
Kyongsang-namdo	3,116,805	9.9	1,552,813	1,563,992	574,219
Chejudo	365,307	1.2	174,963	190,344	82,997
TOTAL	31,460,994	99.9	15,785,705	15,675,289	5,857,943

Source: Based upon data in *Korean Annual 1971*, p. 333.

deposits. Industry is poorly developed with the textile towns of Chungju, Taegu, and Kwangju.

The South-Eastern region includes Kyongsang-namdo and Pusan. A small region of only 4,600 sq. mi. but 14 million people, where an extremely favorable climate and extensive irrigation permit two crops a year (rice and barley). The main industrial centers are Pusan (dominated by textiles, but with a variety of industrial complexes) and Masan (an industrial town).

Population and Social Conditions

The development of the ROK's material base, as outlined above, can only be truly evaluated by considering how living conditions have changed for the people.

As of October, 1970, the ROK had a population of 31,460,594 persons (See Table VII). In 1949, the ROK had a population of only 19 million. However, not all of the increase was due to natural increase; refugees and repatriation from abroad added to the population. A decline of the annual rate of population increase from 2.7 *percent* in 1966 to 1.9 *percent* in 1970, along with declining birth and death rates,[95] reflect significant socio-economic changes in contemporary South Korean society. These phenomena which themselves are the results of important socialogical changes include family planning and later marriages for women.[96] Also, "life expectancy has increased from 34 years in 1934 to 52.5 years in 1957, and 55 years for males and 61 years for females in 1968."[97] These changes reflect the development of an industrial infrastructure in South Korea.

Industrial production is fundamentally an urban activity and the South Korean population has also experienced a rapid urbanization, which has been gaining momentum. In 1960, about 75 *percent* of the population lived in rural areas; by 1970, this number declined to 65 *percent*. However, these figures are much more impressive if viewed from the urban side of the movement. Seoul's population increased from 1.72 million in 1966 to 5.5 million in 1970, while Pusan's population increased from 450,000 to 1.87 million.[98] In fact, almost a quarter of the entire population of South Korea lives in these two cities. Taegu's population has doubled since 1955[99] and Kwanju's population increased from 283,000 in 1960 to 503,000 in 1970.[100] Yet, this phenomenal swelling of South Korea's urban population took place without any concrete planning with regard to housing, basic sanitation, or opportunities for employment, that is—without any concern for the welfare of the Korean working people. As a consequence, South Korean towns are marked by miserable slum shantytowns and rampant unemployment. In Seoul alone, 13 *percent* of the workers are unemployed, with 195,000 people looking for work.[101] Apparently, the unsanitary slum housing conditions were becoming so bad that they jeopardized the profits of the industrial urban areas and some elements of urban planning were introduced in 1967. Housing for the less affluent Korean workers has been constructed as attempted slum removal, but graft and political corruption have resulted in shoddy, unsafe construction. New apartment houses have been known to collapse with the inhabitants inside.[102] This lack of human consideration for the Korean population is based on the Park regime's treatment of the Koreans as cheap labor to be exploited by foreign monopolies.

Health Care

A further indication that the Park regime views the Korean people as a "cheap labor" resource to be exploited and exported according to the needs of foreign capital is reflected in the availability of health care and the export of medical personnel. Although the ROK has a rather high number of physicians for an underdeveloped country (about 47 physicians per 100,000 persons), it is by no means over-supplied. There are 51.5 hospital beds per 100,000

Table VIII: Health Personnel in the ROK

General medical practitioners	14,894
Specialized doctors	4,456
Dentists	2,169
Herb doctors	2,884
Medical doctors[1]	573
Herb doctors[1]	408
Dentists[1]	81
Certified nurses	16,063
Nurses aids	4,647
Mid-wives	6,239
Foreign medical doctors	127
TOTAL	52,541[2]

Source: *Korean Annual 1971*, p. 204.

[1] Practice restricted to designated areas.

[2] This total is much lower than the "total number of medical personnel" (67,774), as well as the sum of the regional distribution of "medical personnel" (69,997) given by the same source (p. 204).

persons and only 52,000 "health personnel" to serve the whole population. (See Table VIII) Note that this figure includes practitioners of traditional medicine as well. In spite of this fact, over 4,500 physicians and 80 dentists are practicing abroad, mostly in the U.S.A.

However because of the extremely uneven geographical distribution of medical personnel, large numbers of South Koreans lack access to any medical attention. Almost 40 *percent* of the ROK's medical personnel are concentrated in Seoul and Pusan, and most of the remainder reside in other cities. Six million people, or 20 *percent* of the ROK's population, live in townships with no physicians.

Education and Culture

Increased investments in South Korea require an infrastructure favorable to industrial production and increased exploitation of the population. This includes a raising of the educational standards of the available manpower resources. To this end the ROK has abolished middle-school entrance examination which proviously required "tortuous out-of-school studies"[103] and thereby opened the opportunities for a middle-school education only to the children of parents capable of sustaining the financial burden of extra tutoring and now has introduced a lottery system. Presumably a lottery system is needed because available middle-school places are limited.

It is interesting to note that despite Japan's vigorous attempts to distort Korean history, the ROK waited until Jan. 1971 to begin rewriting Korean history textbooks, although most of them had been compiled during the period of Japanese rule.[104] This fact underscores the ROK's intention to ignore the working people's appetitle for Korean history and culture and to convert them into merely a *skilled* "cheap labor" resource for export.

Much of the working population of the ROK toils for 12 hours a day, six days a week. The lack of leisure time and poverty deny them access even to the popular culture of movies.[105] For the masses of Koreans in South Korea there is only the culture of poverty.

Conclusion

The general outline of South Korea's economic geography, as presented above, reveals that from whatever sector of the economy considered (agriculture, energy, mining, manufacturing, etc.) the economy of the southern half of the Korean peninsula has been shaped to serve the interest of international capital first and foremost. While the DPRK has been able to create an independent economy serving the interests of the Korean people and can now enter the international trading market as an independent entity, the ROK has become an economically dependent part of the international capitalist system. Disagreement regarding the correctness of a given social or economic policy in the DPRK is possible, yet there is no doubt that these are policies conceived and implemented by the Korean people themselves and not by Ford, Gulf Oil, or the C.I.A. The same cannot be said for the ROK. Of course, the requirements of modern industrial production assured an improvement over the living conditions that existed during the period of Japanese colonial rule. It is obvious, however, from the points made about health and education in the ROK, that basic responses to the people's needs are met only grudgingly. The fundamental difference between the DPRK and ROK is very simple: economic development in the DPRK is carried out to provide the means for improving the standard of living of the Korean people; industrial and agricultural investments in the ROK must, first and foremost, provide maximum profits for world monopoly capitalism.

[1] Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), pp. 351-352. *Vide.* pp. 347-443. Gayn, then a correspondent for the *Chicago Sun* was an eye-witness to the intrigues and brutality of the U.S. Military Government's creation of a rightist Korean government to its liking. This book has become a minor classic.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 362.

[3] Colonel William Maglin, American chief of the Police Division of the Military Government, quoted by Gayn, p. 391.

[4] A much briefer account of this period than that presented by Gayn which cites different incidents but is similar in tone is Robert Klonsky, "27 Years Ago: A United States Soldier in South Korea," *Korea Focus* 11. I (Jan.-Feb., 1973) pp. 61-64.

[5] The term "personal dictatorship" is used in *Korea and the Philippines: November 1972.* A Staff Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 44.

[6] Patricia M. Bartz, *South Korea* (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1972) p. 64.

[7] Albert Kolb, *Ostasien* (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer Verlag, 1963) p. 481. Figures converted from hectares into acres. [8] *Ibid.*

[9] Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography* Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956), pp. 174-175. [10] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[11] This is about 7,603,364 acres. One *chongbo* equals 2.45 acres. [12] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[13] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[14] V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 168. [15] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[16] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 183. [17] *Ibid.*, p. 173. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

[19] 330,750 acres. [20] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

[21] *Ibid.*, he states that 134 lbs/ac are applied to the arable fields. [22] *Ibid.* [23] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 68. [25] *Ibid.*, p. 70. [26] *Ibid.*

[27] Alice Taylor, "Korea" *Focus XII.* 4 (December, 1961) p. 6. [28] *Korea Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 171.

[29] *Ibid.* [30] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[31] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[32] *Welthandbuch: Internationaler Politischer and Wirtschaftlicher Almanach* (Budapest: Corvina Verlag, 1962), pp. 743-744. [33] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[34] *Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, op. cit.*, p. 17. [35] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[36] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 76. [37] *Ibid.*

[38] "South Korean Farm Wife Finds Her Life is Improving a Little," *New York Times,* (Oct. 15, 1973).

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Vide.* A Staff Report . . ., *op. cit.*, pp. 7-11. According to one American businessman "the Korean CIA was very business oriented." [41] Marytnov, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[42] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 84. [43] *Ibid.*, p. 145. [44] *Ibid.*

[45] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 177. *Korean Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 178 states that during 1971, $4,347,000 worth of anthracite was exported. [46] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[47] "The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1972-1976)" *Korea Observer* V, 4 (Oct. 1972) p. 367.

[48] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

[49] *Korean Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 184.

[50] Ulsan Oil Refinery Co.

[51] The government-owned Korean Oil Corp. (KOCO).

[52] Honam Oil Co. [53] The "Lucky Group of Korea."

[54] Kyong-in Energy Co.

[55] *Vide. Korean Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 183 and "Korea's Oil Refinery Industry" Korean Reference Service, Seoul, Korea (August 31, 1972).

[56] "Korea's Oil Refinery Industry," *op. cit.* [57] *Ibid.*

[58] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 178. [59] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 181. [61] *Ibid.*, p. 87. [62] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[63] *Ibid.* [64] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 149. [65] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 149, 183. The Paldang dam is being constructed with French loans, according to Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 179. [67] Martynov. *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[68] *Ibid.* [69] *Ibid.*, p. 180. [70] *Ibid.* [71] *Ibid.*

[72] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 87. [73] *Ibid.*

[74] "Mining Industry in Korea," *Korean Reference Service* (August 11, 1972). [75] Marytnov, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[76] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[77] Martynov, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

[78] Bartz, *op. cit., p. 155*

[79] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 183. [80] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[81] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[82] "The Third Five-year Economic Development Plan (1972-1976) (II)" *Korea Observer* IV 4 (October, 1972) p. 361. [83] *Ibid.*

[84] Declared a "special industrial area" in 1962.

[85] *Korean Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 179.

[86] "The Thrid Five-year Economic Development Plan (1972-1976)," *op. cit.*, p. 369. [87] *Ibid.*

[88] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 88. [89] *Ibid.*

[90] Martynov, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.

[91] Korean Annual 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[92] *Vide.* Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 92. [93] *Ibid.*

[94] A Staff Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

[95] Death rates declined from 10.5% in 1962 to 9.6% in 1965 to 8.5% in 1970.

[96] *Vide.* Lee-Jay Cho and Man-jun Hahm "Recent change in Fertility Rates of the Korean Population" *Demography* Vol. , No. , pp. 690-698.

[97] Bartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55. However, the *Korean Annual 1971, op. cit.*, p. 334 gives the 1968 figures as 60.5 years for males and 67.7 years for females.

[98] *Korean Annual 1971 op. cit.*, p. 333.

[99] Bartz, *op. cit.*, p. 167. [100] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[102] G. Breidenstein, "Capitalism in South Korea," *Korea Focus* II, 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1973), p. 8.

[103] *Korean Annual 1972, op. cit.*, p. 221.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[105] Fox Butterfield, "South Korea Keeps Labor Costs Down," *New York Times,* Aug. 17, 1974.

BY ANGELO D'ANGELO

One of the recent issues of the Japanese weekly Asahi Journal *carried an article by Li Ryong Un, a former chief of staff of the South Korean navy.*

Mr. Li is now residing in the United States. He had escaped to Japan and became active in the anti-Park movement there.

Following are extracts of his statements in the Ashai *article*:

"Park Chung Hee always accentuated the threat from the north in an attempt to justify his own dictatorship. But to tell the truth, the threat from North Korea was, without exception, provocations committed by the ROK army itself.

As for the threat, what should be considered is the realistic threat of the nuclear destructive power of South Korea. No matter how sharp the confrontation may be, we should not divorce ourselves from objectively looking at the reality of nuclear holocaust.

The so-called "West Sea Incident" on February 15, 1974 was a provocation committed by the Park regime. Seoul had announced that the navy of the DPRK had illegally sunk two fishing boats that were 35 miles west of the fishing limit line. However, this area is not part of the territorial waters of southern Korea.

These two "fishing boats" were sent to the waters of the DPRK, escorted by the ROK navy, on orders from the South Korea Central Intelligence Agency.

No sooner had Seoul announced the incident than government-sponsored demonstrations were staged to denounce the so-called "aggression from the north." In Seoul alone, about a million citizens were mobilized on Feb. 22 in such a demonstration. It was clear what Park Chung Hee was really after.

The student uprising scheduled for March 1 was completely ignored in the hysteria of the feverish government sponsored demonstration.

* * *

The "East Side Incident" which occurred on June 28th was also a farce staged by the Park regime for its domestic purposes.

At first, the Park regime announced that the naval craft of the north invaded the waters 9 miles south of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line and attacked an ROK patrol boat. But when questioned at the ROK national assembly, the Ministry of National Defense changed its earlier announcement, saying: the patrol boat sailed out to the waters 1 mile south of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line to protect fishing boats and crossed the Demarcation Line, drifted by the tidal current, where it was attacked by the DPRK and sunk at a point around 6 miles north of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line.

The waters 1 mile south of the extension of the Military Demarcation Line is a closed region for fishing to which South Korean fisherman are banned with the threat of death sentence. Hence, it is impossible that the ROK patrol sailed out there for protecting fishing boats.

The truth is that the Park regime sent the patrol boat into the territorial waters of North Korea to create a political tension by provoking Pyongyang.

Why did Seoul need a political tension at that time?

The intention of Park was to whip up anti-Communist hysteria with an outcry over the so-called "threat from the north" and, in this confusion, destroy at one stroke the opposition forces at home.

* * *

Harry S. Ashmore of the *Los Angeles Times* in his "The Sorry Case of Kim Dae-jung" (June 9, *The Washington Star-News*), observed:

"Various considerations sustain a growing belief that, despite the official protestations of their governments, there are a good many powerful strategically placed Americans and Japanese who have a vested interest in (Dae-jung) Kim's continued silence and no real disposition to press for his release."

* * *

On June 12th, 1974 Senator Alan Cranston in a testimony before the Sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

"We can't kid ourselves about democracy anymore, not after President Park dissolved the Assembly, declared martial law and assumed dictatorial powers in 1972."

* * *

South Korea which is building a 500,000-KW atomic power plant near Pusan, will have a total of four (4) nuclear power facilities by 1981.

* * *

A.P. News Service issued the following dispatch concerning the Pueblo controversy:

"The controversy over the capture of the *USS Pueblo* has surfaced again with a charge by the

ship's former executive officer that Cmdr. Lloyd Bucher prolonged the crew's suffering with "self-centered antics."

The charge came at a small military ceremony at which Edward R. Murphy, once Bucher's second-in-command, was to be awarded the Navy Commendation medal.

As Murphy was about to get his medal, he suddenly said, "I'd like to read a statement."

He rejected the medal as shallow and said that he and another officer had accepted a North Korean offer "to man the *USS Pueblo* and return it and the crew to our country." He said Bucher and other officers refused.

Murphy said the North Koreans then called off the release of the 83-man crew because of Bucher's recalcitrant attitude. Murphy said obscene gestures in propaganda photographs and unusual phrasing written into the crew's "confession" angered the North Koreans.

"I bitterly fought my commanding officer to subdue his self-centered antics which were later to cause severe mental torture to the crew, and to cancel our repatriation for nearly three months," he said.

• • •

A four-member delegation of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF), visiting South Korea in late October, concluded that many people whose activities have been considered subversive by the ROK government are patriotic citizens who seek to strengthen their country through the establishment of democracy and justice.

The delegation, which spent a week in South Korea, met with students, church leaders, educators, families of political prisoners, and politicians as well as government representatives, but were unable to visit any of the ROK government's political prisoners.

• • •

Problems facing the South Korean economy are manifest in South Korea's balance of trade. During the first half of 1974, the total cost of major raw materials increased 11% over the cost of similar raw materials imports for the entire 12-month period of 1973, while the quantity of imports has remained roughly the same. The cost of crude oil, which accounts for 16% of South Korea's total imports and amounted to $262 million last year, may top the $1 billion mark this year—a sum roughly equivalent to South Korea's total trade deficit in 1973. While imports are increasing, there has been a slowdown in demand for South Korea's exports. In a recent five-month period, U.S. textile imports from South Korea were 37% below last year's level. Lack of demand in U.S. and Japanese markets has also slowed production in South Korea's plywood, electronics, and wig industries.

• • •

The Christian Presbyterian Assosociation of South Korea on Oct. 11, 1974 held a meeting in Seoul and published a declaration strongly demanding the immediate release of imprisoned clergymen and students.

Earlier, on Oct. 9, over 20,000 clergymen throughout south Korea gathered on the campus of Catholic Theological College in Seoul and held a meeting denouncing the dictatorship and suppression by the Seoul government.

Retired Rear Admiral Gene R. Larocque, former Captain of the

• • •

U.S. Seventh Fleet's Flagship, exposed at the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that "U.S. warships do not unload their nuclear weapons before entering foreign ports" and that ". . . American nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs are kept in igloo-shaped, concrete store houses" in south Korea (Washington, A.P., October 6, 1974).

The aircraft carrier *Midway* carried nuclear weapons to the port of Pusan in south Korea on October 4 (south Korean "Radio Pusan," October 4, 1974).

Besides, the U.S. Army has been conducting exercises of firing guided missiles near the demilitarized zone which were introduced in violation of the Armistice Agreement.

On September 19, the Pentagon mobilized the 4th missile command and a battery, first battalion, 42nd artillery of the occupation forces to the vicinity of Sayo-Ri south of the demilitarized zone. Several "Honest John" rockets were fired (*Stars and Stripes*, September 21, 1974) and an entire battery of the "Nike Hercules" guided missiles were airlifted to the vicinity near the demiltarized zone (*Stars and Stripes*, October 1, 1974).

• • •

The September 20 issue of the Japanese weekly *Asahi Journal* published an article by Chong Gyong Mo, who is affiliated with "Mindan" (ROK Residents Association in Japan).

The author writes in the first part of his article that the "incident of shooting at Park by Mun Se Gwang was stagemanaged by the Seoul regime.

Asking who is behind the "shooting incident," the author says:

According to the announcement of the South Korean authorities, Mun Se Gwang safely surmounted the dangers he himself ran on six occasions.

He risked the dangers, firstly, when he stole a pistol from the Japanese police; secondly, when he obtained a passport disguised as a Japanese and got a visa at the south Korean "consulate"; thirdly, when even with that pistol he got into an airplane at the Itatsuke airport in Japan; fourthly, when he passed the extremely strict check at the Kimpo airport; fifthly, when he entered the meeting hall carrying the pistol with him and sixthly, when Mun Se Gwang who had never done a practice in ball firing hit the podium at which Park was making a speech.

The meeting hall was guarded heavily, and even a bullet-proof podium was prepared in advance. How could a young man without any "invitation card" gain free admission to the meeting hall?

To all intents and purposes, it is out of the bounds of possibility that Mun Se Gwang could act single-handed from the very start to finish. Someone was certainly pulling the wires.

The theatre of activity of Mun Se Gwang covered South Korea and Japan. From this it follows that his wirepuller was based in south Korea or in Japan.

Supposing that Mun Se Gwang's backstage wirepuller was based in Japan, it was actually impossible for him to help Mun in his activities in south Korea and act as his guide. It is hardly thinkable that Chongryon or the "National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy in South Korea and Promotion of

Unification" could help Mun Se Gwang in his activity after he set foot in the Kimpo airport.

If any South Korea-based organization had wirepulled Mun behind the scene, it would not have been impossible to spirit a prominent figure to Seoul from Tokyo, either.

Who could then work in the backgrounds of Mun's activity both in South Korea and Japan? The answer is clear.

Who fired the bulled that killed Ryuk Yong Su (wife of Chung Hee Park).

Mun Se Gwang fired four bullets in all, including the first one that hit the upper part of his left thigh. According to south Korean press reports, there were four spots that bore the marks of bullets—the podium, the flag, the ceiling and an ordinary seat. According to what was announced in south Korea, Ryuk Yong Su was killed by the third bullet of Mun Se Gwang. Judging from the position from where Mun Se Gwang fired at that time, it was quite possible that all the bullets that hit the podium, the flag, and the ceiling were fired by him. If the bullet that killed Ryuk Yong Su was fired by Mun Se Gwang, it must be proved that one of the three bullet marks at least does not belong to him. But no evidence in his favor has been produced so far by the south Korean authorities.

Ryuk Yong Su was sitting some way off the right side of the podium. Then from where was the bullet fired to kill Ryuk Yong Su?

The South Korean investigation authorities should have produced scientifically substantiated data to show from where the bullet was fired and to what direction it flew. It is a unilateral announcement of the south Korean investigation authorities that Ryuk Yong Su was killed by the third bullet by Mun Se Gwang.

There is no objective evidence proving it. Mun Se Gwang, it is said, did not understand why the interrogator was wearing a black ribbon on August 17; he was ignorant of the fact that Ryuk Yong Su was hit by a bullet. It is certain that Mun did not fire at Ryuk Yong Su.

There is another puzzle. The south Korean investigation authorities insist that there was not an accomplice of Mun Se Gwang in south Korea despite many evidences proving the contrary. It was confirmed twice there was another man besides Mun in his room No. 1030 of the Chosen Hotel where he was quartered, when two girl clerks of the tourist agency telephoned him. They first rang up at 17:00, August 10 and next time at 17:00, August 13. It was a man speaking Korean who took the receiver first each time. Mun replied next. According to the testimony given by Mun's friends in Osaka, he cannot speak Korean at all. It is now recognized that meals for two persons were served in room No. 1030 on the morning of August 14.

A cigar butt was discovered in Mun's room. It was reported that this was stained with Mun's saliva. As far as I investigated, he usually does not smoke strong tobacco. No one in Japan has ever seen him smoking a cigar.

I dare say that there must be an accomplice of Mun Se Gwang in south Korea. How can one say that Park is not No. 1 suspect?

Many people may think it an "impossibility" for Park to have stagemanaged a dramatic murder of his wife. But, he is a man who has so far performed too many "impossibilities."

* * *

The November 15th and November 21st (1974) issues of *Unidad*, weekly organ of the Communist Party of Peru, reported on the convening of the Latin American "Encounter" held in Lima, Peru.

The Encounter was in session from November 12th through November 14th and at its completion issued a statement expressing support for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, and for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the aegis of the "United Nations Command."

The Encounter was preceded by a press conference in the Riviera Hotel, which opened a photographic exhibit on socialist construction in the DPRK. Present at the Encounter were delegations from twenty Latin American countries, representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, and the public at large, which filled to capacity the Civic Center auditorium. Also present were representatives of political, labor, and cultural organizations.

According to *Unidal* reports, Deputy Kim Gwan Sop, representing the DPRK, presented a review of the efforts that were made by his government and people for the reunification of Korea over the last thirty years.

Mr. Sop concluded his speech with an expression of solidarity between the Korean people and the people of Cuba, and solidarity in the fight for national liberation with the people of Panama, Peru, Venezuela and other countries.

* * *

Senator James Abourezk recently told the senate "In Korea, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Uruguay, in Brazil, and in scores of other countries whose governments are our 'friends,' the government of the U.S. sits idly by while grave acts of torture and murder continue to be committed.

"In a recent article in the *New York Times*, Anthony Lewis summed up American indifference best:

'Some of the nastiest governments in the world today were born or grew up with American aid.

'That being the case, the most modest view of our responsibility would require us to say a restraining word to them occasionally.

'But we say nothing, we hear nothing, we see nothing.'"

* * *

The Asian city of Samarkand in the USSR was the scene of a recent international conference of Asian peoples dealing with peace and security in that part of the world.

One of the opening addresses to the participants in the Samarkand Conference, was given by Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev who spoke of the Asian peoples struggles against foreign aggression and the aid of the Soviet Union in that struggle.

"Throughout its history, the Soviet Union has been resolutely supporting the struggle of Asian peoples against imperialism and colonialism, for freedom and independence," declared the General Secretary. "The Soviet Union took a firm stand on the side of the peo-

ples of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina." Mr. Brezhnev continued, "The assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the successes in the struggle against attempts to rekindle hotbeds of tension in the world, for the liquidation of the remaining colonial regimes, create new favorable opportunities for the triumph of the cause of peace and progress and meet the vital interests of all the countries, including those in Asia.

* * *

The DPRK was elected executive member of the Asian Games Federation at a special meeting of the council held in the Iranian capital.

South Korea, Israel and two other countries failed to get elected to the executive committee.

* * *

The richest harvest of fruits ever recorded has been reaped this year on the fruit farms of socialist Korea.

A bountiful harvest of apples, pears, and persimmons has been gathered in the young orchards which have taken shape on hills along Pukchong county, on the east coast. The area is noted for its apples and is expected to record the richest harvest of apples this year.

* * *

The price of rice is sharply soaring in South Korea.

South Korean radios reported that rice prices which stood at 18,000-18,500 "won" per straw bag (60kg) in July and August in Seoul, Pusan, Wonju, and other cities went up to 19,000 "won" in early September. Rice prices show a sign of steady rise these days when new crops are put on the market.

The present rice price in south Korea is ten times that of 1963 when it was around 2,000 "won," or two times that at the end of last year when the figure stood at 9,500-9,900 "won."

* * *

Between the late 12th and early 13th century books were printed in metal type in Korea.

The "Kogumsangjongryemun" or code of laws published between 1234 and 1241 points out that it was printed in metal type.

This shows that Korea used metal types 200 odd years earlier than other countries with a long tradition in use of metal types.

After the invention of metal type, printing developed in Korea.

A metal type founding and printing house was established in 1382 and it undertook type-founding and book-printing under state control.

In 1403 a type of foundry was set up separately. It cast hundreds of thousands of copper types and printed a great number of books.

Later, metal type underwent technical improvement. The improved types were called "kapinja types" which were graceful, distinct in shape and much harder in printing than the old ones.

Metal type continued to develop. In 1436 lead types were manufactured for the first time. A typical book printed in lead type was the history book "Sayongjonhunui Chachitonggamgangmok" which was printed in over 300,000 copies.

The book won a gold medal at the international book exhibition in 1959 held in Leipzig, G.D.R.

* * *

A resolution on solidarity with the struggling Korean people was adopted at the 9th Congress of the World Federation of Democratic Youth recently held in Varna, Bulgaria.

The resolution called for the U.S. to withdraw unconditionally all its armed forces from southern Korea and for the U.S. to accept the DPRK proposal for concluding a peace agreement that would end once and for all the armed tensions on the Korean peninsula.

* * *

The Third Asian Buddhist Peace Conference that was recently held in New Delhi, India was attended by over 200 delegates from 19 Buddhist organizations throughout the world.

The conference went on record in opposing the U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula and in supporting the DPRK's proposals for Korean unification.

* * *

Speaking at the 29th UN General Assembly Session, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said that the item concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in south Korea had a direct bearing on the improvement of the Asian situation.

"The presence of these foreign troops are a source of constant military and political tension on the Korean Peninsula," Gromyko noted, and stressed that "the presence of these troops has become all the more unjust under the present condition where new steps are being taken for achieving the peaceful reunification of Korea at the initiative of the DPRK."

* * *

In Seoul air pollutants amounted to 693 tons per square kilometre in 1972 alone, three times as high as the permissible contaminant criteria. The penetration of the sun's rays has now dwindled by one third as compared with 1965.

Out of the gases polluting the atmosphere of Seoul are sulphurous acid gases above the environmental standards—4 to 5 times. The carbon monoxide poisoning from automobile exhausts on the central streets of Seoul is 3 to 10 times greater than the set standards. The figure will go up by 20 times in 1976 unless pollution control is employed.

This situation is not confined to Seoul alone. The same is true of other cities in southern Korea such as Taegu, Inchon, and Pusan.

Such noxious fumes produce serious effects in the workers employed in such occupations producing rubber, electricity, chemical goods and machines. The officially published data reveal that 40.7 per cent of workers in Seoul, Kyonggi and South Chungchong provinces suffer from industrial illness.

Many people are stricken with cerebral anemia and heart diseases and the number of bronchitis and TB cases are also on the increase. Every year 80,000-100,000 south Koreans die of T.B. Persons who have lung impairments account for 100,000 every year. These disasters are directly related to increased poisonous products.

* * *

Guero Grozev, representing the Bulgarian People's Republic, stressed that "the foreign military occupation of southern Korea is the product of the maneuvers of imperialist forces." Grozev's speech, which was delivered at the First Committee of the 29th UN General Assembly, demanded the with-

drawal of all foreign troops from southern Korea.

"There is no doubt that Korea's reunification would have occurred long ago," Grozev stated," if the Korean people had been able to settle their own problems, without outside interference."

Faithful to its policy in keeping with the principles of the north-south joint statement, the Government of the DPRK is continuing energetically to do everything in its power to bring about a practical solution to the reunification of Korea.

In contradiction to this solution, the Seoul authorities and those who support them continue to rely on outside forces to keep Korea divided.

Can anyone have any doubt concerning the basis of Seoul's policy and the source of its inspiration? It's a secret to no one that while on the territory of the DPRK there is not a single foreign soldier, in southern Korea there are tens of thousands of armed foreign troops, American troops, who are illegally using the flag of the United Nations.

The presence of foreign armed forces in southern Korea is a political anachronism. As a matter of fact, the decision to dissolve the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has confirmed the absence of any legal justification for the interference by the U.N in the internal affairs of Korea.

* * *

Professor Gregory Henderson, once the cultural attache of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea, denounced Park Chung Hee in an article written for the *Christian Science Monitor*. Citing an example that included the 1948 communist uprising which Park, then an officer of the military government, partook in Ryosu against the United States.

But, it is not the U.S. military occupation government alone that Park betrayed. Though, Prof. Henderson did not mention it in his article, Park was the operational staff officer of the 14th Regiment which revolted and kept the secrets of the Ryosu Incident. After being arrested by the U.S. army, he pleaded for his life in return for a list of names of the participants in the revolt. Park submitted the list of the entire revolters. All were shot, with the exception of Park, himself. What astonished the judges concerned with the trials was that the list of the names furnished by Park included Pak Dong Hi, his own elder brother.

* * *

The 18th Annual General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held recently in Vienna, Austria.

The Plenary Session discussed the question of admitting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the IAEA and unanimously decided without voting to accept the DPRK as a member of this agency.

* * *

Recently the Hamhung Geophysical Prospecting Corps discovered huge deposits of iron ore with high content in the northern inland and western regions of the DPRK.

Geological Prospecting Teams were organized during the Korean War of the 1950's in which a policy of geological surveying was set forth. In order to develop the geophysical prospecting work, the DPRK government secured up-to-date prospecting instruments for the Hamhung Geophysical Prospecting Corps.

* * *

A new People's Palace of Culture has been built on the corner of Chollima Street in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK.

The palace was built according to a plan for construction of the capital that was devised after the destruction of Pyongyang by U.S. armed forces in the Korea War.

* * *

Since August 1945 until June 1974 South Korea received $5.96 billion in economic aid and $6.2 billion in military aid from the U.S. (Congressional Record, September 11).

* * *

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union held a press conference in Washington urging the U.S. negotiators "to take a strong position" in the renegotiation of a trade pact with South Korea (in Seoul, in November).

Murray H. Finley, the union's president, said:

"We have knowledge that clothing for the American market is being produced in South Korea by workers paid 11 cents an hour."

From ancient times south Korea was known as the granary of all of Korea. In the past this area had met its own requirement for provisions and shipped out 10 million "sok" (one sok equals 150kg) of rice to foreign markets every year.

But today South Korea under American occupation has turned into a zone of chronic famine which has to import more than 3 million tons of rice annually, far from exporting food grain.

Even according to the figures released by Seoul, south Korea's proportion of self-sufficiency in food was 87% in 1961, 79.8% in 1967, 75.2% in 1971 and 68.6% in 1973.

The steady decline of the proportion of self-sufficiency in food is directly connected with the fact that farm produce is on the ebb in south Korea from year to year.

Speaking of the grain output in recent years, in 1972 it went down by 1.5 million tons below the average harvest.

Last year, the grain showed a further decrease. This year the output will be smaller than last year.

* * *

In Seoul, the government had to break up the annual meeting of the carefully controlled Federation of Korean Trade Unions when a majority of delegates tried to oust the Government-appointed president.

* * *

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural organization (UNESCO) unanimously decided, without voting, to admit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Organization as a formal member state.

Chinese Art Comes to Washington

By JONATHAN GOLDSTEIN

For years one of the least known museums in Washington has been the Freer Gallery (the small, low building tucked alongside the far more impressive Smithsonian Institution). The Freer is best known for its paintings by James Whistler. It also houses the Smithsonian's collection of pre-modern Chinese handicrafts—one of the finest assemblages of such pieces in the western world. Last December, directly across from the Freer, in the National Gallery of Art, an even more extensive exhibit of Chinese artifacts opened. It might have escaped public notice as the Freer has all these years, except for the fact that the Exhibit's 385 objects were discovered by the Chinese communists since 1949, and have been loaned to the U.S. and other countries by the People's Republic in a widely publicized gesture. The Freer objects, of course, are of pre-1949 excavation. Now two major shows of Chinese artifacts coexist within blocks of each other. But since the Freer is here to stay, and the Gallery display will depart March 30, it might be well to focus on the less permanent exhibit and the unusual circumstances that surround its visit to the nation's capital.

The unfreezing of political relations with the Chinese People's Republic seems to be the fundamental reason for the appearance of this unusual show. Détente has evoked a popular curiosity about a land of which we have had virtually no direct knowledge for twenty-five years. For the last several years, many American colleges have been catering to this interest by spicing-up standard Western history curricula with a course or two on modern China. The Lilly Foundation, working through the Association for Asian Studies, has sponsored conferences on the teaching of Chinese history in the secondary school. The 1972 publication of Carl Crossman's *The China Trade* alerted Americans to the wide variety of Chinese handicrafts imported into early America. In addition to custom ceramic ware made for the American market, Mr. Crossman noted varieties of Chinese gold, silverware, textiles, jadework, lacquerware, and bone carvings. These products have in recent years been secluded in private collections and dusty corners of museums, although they played a much more open and functional role in the U.S. of 150 years ago. Now, in response to heightened interest in things Chinese, a mammoth exhibition of many of these same types of products, which the Chinese have been using for centuries in their own land, has been mounted in the National Gallery. It will subsequently be shown in Kansas City's Nelson Gallery, one of the other outstanding and little known, American repositories of orientalia.

The display has been organized and captioned to People's Republic specifications. In Marxist fashion, artifacts are grouped as being representative of classless primitive communal society, of slave society, and of feudal society. Concerning the accomplishments of slave society, for example, we are admonished by a wall inscription that "the facts of history show that it was the slaves who, with their wisdom and labor, developed production and created a splendid civilization." What would the Mellon family, who built the National Gallery, and whose dour portraits stare down on visitors to the Chinese exhibit, say to that?

The primitive section contains Chinese relics between 600,000 and 6,000 years old. A cave man's skull has been reconstructed and is surrounded by bone implements, a stone wheel for spinning thread, and pots showing the early evolution of ceramics from crude, hand-fashioned pieces to painted, baked, and wheel-spun items. One jug bears the decorative im-

Jonathan Goldstein is a scholar of Chinese-American relations with a Ph.D. degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of *Philadelphia and the China Trade, 1682-1846* which will be published by Pennsylvania State University Press.

pression of cloth. A detailed representation of the development of Chinese ceramics is one of the two major artistic features of the show, the other being the extensive display of tomb and funerary items. The pottery spread through the three sections and thirty-four galleries shows the further evolution of Chinese ceramic technique. Vessels were produced with much variations in shape, ornamentation, surface structure indentation, and clay type and color. Glaze use evolved from a monochromatic application on early pieces to decorative glaze and underglaze motifs, such as the well-known blue-and-white, which the Chinese began to produce after the introduction of cobalt from the Middle East.

The display of tomb and funerary items includes two multi-color wall paintings from an 8th century A.D. royal tomb, depicting a procession of some forty mounted hunters and their spirited beasts. The Chinese, like other civilizations, not only believed in an afterlife, but also in the need to sustain it through the inclusion of special objects next to the body and throughout the tomb. Perhaps because of its lustrous nature, jade was thought to have particular life-giving qualities. Just as the ruler wore jade pendants to sustain him in life, so did he and his family surround themselves with jade in death. All of the body openings were stuffed with jade after death. We see a princess's shroud from the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) composed entirely of jade tiles stitched together with gold thread. Intricate bronzework was included in tombs as far back as the Shang Dynasty, which lasted approximately from the sixteenth to the eleventh centuries B.C. The entire show contains bronze cooking tripods and ceremonial wine and food vessels whose use and design are clearly explained in catalogues available at the exhibit entryway. Some urns are covered with decoration inside and out. Others bear a single elemental motif, such as a smooth, smiling face. A Han dynasty leaping bronze horse, with one hoof on a swallow to indicate its speed, is accorded an entire gallery, as is a cortège of bronze horses, warriors, chariots, and ostlers.



In addition to such classic examples of Chinese art as the princess's shroud and the galloping horse, examples are also offered of such commonly used items as a crude spade, chisel, and needle; wool weaving; and an iron ax mold. Yes, there is even a fried bread roll and two *chiaotzu* (dumplings) which have managed to survive since the seventh century A.D. The exhibit is hardly representative of the lifestyle of ordinary Chinese people. But common objects like the above do communciate something about how people lived in ancient China. Perhaps the finest attribute of the show is that a person with no background in Chinese history could, through studious observation of such objects and the use of abundant and readily available descriptive material, acquire an appreciation and understanding of the Chinese people and their civilization.

Apart from observing the objects themselves, in attending this show one is subjected to a barrage of conflicting Chinese and American influences, as has been already suggested. The opening night reviewers' preview was cancelled by the National Gallery after the Chinese insisted on the exclusion of South Korean, Chinese Nationalist, South African, and Israeli newsmen. One approaches the exhibit through the marble corridors, a panelled checkroom, past the Mellon portraits, finally to an anteroom where one is confronted with a dozen blazing red-and-white floor-to-ceiling banners proclaiming (in Chinese): "Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China." The brochure handed all entrants states that, on the one hand, the calligraphic display just witnessed is the personal handiwork of the Marxist philosopher Kuo Mo-jo, and, on the other hand, that the exhibit has been funded in part by IBM. To boggle the mind further, one is, at that point, face to face with a wall inscription that "since the founding of the People's Republic of China, archaeological work, guided by Chairman Mao's policy of 'making the past serve the present,' has made marked progress."

This particular exhibit does more than educate the American viewer about pre-modern Chinese handicrafts, although that is certainly its major function and outstanding feature. The show is testimony of the extent to which détente with People's China has, or has not, progressed. It is the end product of at least one year's intensive consultation between high-level Chinese and American scholars and statesmen (in Hugh Scott's case can we say both?) serving on at least five distinct coordinating committees, invoking the services of designer-consultants Gaillard Ravenal and George Sexton, and supervising the professional staffs of two major museums. The end product reflects

the varied interests at work here: the Chinese, anxious to please their U.S. friends yet desirous to present what they see as an accurate interpretation of their own past and present: and American politicians equally anxious both to please and satisfy the popular appetite for information about mainland China. The exhibit has drawn record-breaking crowds in London, Paris, Stockholm, Vienna, and Toronto. Yet the fact that it is now being shown in Washington, seat of the government which Peking has considered the bane of its existence, and the manner in which this accommodation has painstakingly been made, is as remarkable as the art objects themselves. "Under the circumstances," *The New York Times* remarked on the show's opening day, "it is a mercy—as Henry James once said of Chartres—that the thing turns out to be as fine as it is." This reviewer will be satisfied if, as a result of the Chinese exhibit, attendance at the Freer Gallery picks up.

Book Review

And North of the 38th Parallel?

By WILLIAM POMEROY

Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945. *Frank Baldwin, editor. Pantheon Books. $15.00 hardcover, $3.95 paperback.*

The trend in recent years chiefly among the younger Asian scholars in the U.S. toward a sternly objective, realistic assessment of U.S. policies in Asia has reinvigorated this sector of historical writing. It has been strippng away the false fronts and disguised reasons for those policies built by the wholesale subsidizing of academic activity during the cold war years by the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the big Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.

Among the most searching of the new studies have been those examining U.S. China policy, the U.S.-Japan relationship, the bloody disaster of aggression in Vietnam, and the patterns of U.S. investment and foreign aid in Asia. The fact that these studies have begun to appear on the lists of some of the major U.S. publishing houses is an indication of how deep the furrows they have plowed have gone and of how well the crop of revised attitudes has grown.

Attention is now being turned to U.S. policy toward Korea, a tendency not unrelated to the pioneering work done by *Korea Focus* and the American Korean Friendship and Information Center.

One of the latest of the Asian studies, *Without Parallel,* undertakes a many-faceted analysis of that Korean policy, from its inception at the end of World War II to its tragic climax in the Korean War of 1950-53 to its erection of neo-colonial police state in the southern part of the artificially divided country.

Edited by Frank Baldwin, who formerly taught Korean history, language and politics at Columbia Unversity, it is a collection of seven essays by various authors plus an introduction by the editor. The authors–Bruce Cumings, Herbert Bix, Robert Simmons, Jon Halliday, Gerhard Breidenstein, Bernard Wideman and James Palais—are mostly of academic background or association. Breidenstein is German, Halliday is British.

The essays cover the following: "American Policy and Korean Liberation" (Cumings), "The United Nations and Korea" (Halliday), "The Korean Civil War" (Simmons), "Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America's Asian Policy" (Bix), "Capitalism in South Korea" (Breidenstein), "The Plight of the

South Korean Peasant" (Wideman), and "'Democracy' in South Korea, 1948-72" (Palais).

It is unfortunate that this is a very uneven collection of studies, as far as quality and perceptiveness of scholarship are concerned, a fact that may well be traceable to the paucity still of objective Korean studies. Barely half of the essays—those by Frank Baldwin, Bruce Cumings, Herbert Bix and Jon Halliday—provide the adequate framework and detail for an analysis in depth.

These, however, are sufficient in themselves to take apart U.S. policy since 1945 and to set the record straight for a generation of Americans raised on the cold war propaganda of U.S. government agencies and their apologists. It is a grim, ugly record of the expunging of democratic processes, popular movements and the opportunities of independent development from South Korea, first by U.S. occupation forces and then by the puppet dictators placed and propped up in power with U.S. support.

Perhaps the most important point stressed in several of these essays is that the U.S. intervened in Korea, not as the cold war propaganda claimed in order to block or contain the alleged expansion of the Soviet Union and China, but in a *Korean* situation, "in a moment of singular renaissance for the Korean people," as Frank Baldwin states. Baldwin says further: "American power collided not with the Red Army but with the Korean revolution, Korean demands for social justice and rapid political change." The point is strongly made, too, that the Korean War was a case of U.S. intervention in a Korean civil war, and that whatever the circumstances of the initiation of that war it was a Korean internal matter.

The discussion of events and policies in these essays is best for the period up to and during the Korean War. For the subsequent two decades, particularly for the South Korean economy, the analysis is rather superficial and naive, due quite obviously to a lack of understanding of the aims and operation of neocolonialism.

Illuminating as much of this book will be to the general reader, it stands as only half an approach to the Korean question: there are no essays and no more than passing reference to North Korea, to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. Along with this is a neglect of the entire question of reunification, which one wouldn't even know existed on the basis of this book's contents.

The editor offers an apologetic explanation of the reason for the absence of an analysis of the DPRK and its development, saying that it was originally intended to include "at least three" essays on North Korea "to examine the stereotype of North Korea presented in the West," but that the idea was abandoned either because potential writers were not enabled to visit the DPRK or because available studies in the U.S. "had nothing to offer this kind of essay collection." Finally the plan was given up because "it became apparent that the present essays had reached a length that precluded additional material without sacrificing completed work."

Aside from the fact that some of the completed material might well have been sacrificed, none of the apologies carry weight, including the editor's final feeble excuse that "neither North nor South Korea is necessarily *the* Korea of the future." An abundance of KOREA FOCUS 10r11 Cale m6 r. heck material exists concerning the DPRK, documentary and otherwise, including the first-hand reports of people who *have* visited there. To picture the DPRK as a mysterious hinterland not known to western man and not able to be analysed is to seriously mar the design of such a book as this. Along with this needs to be mentioned the almost total lack of citations from Communist or any left-wing sources in the voluminous notes appended to each of these essays, part of a general one-sided U.S. academic tendency that detracts from even the best of the new Asian studies.

Without Parallel can be recommended as a good partial introduction to the Korean question. It is difficult to avoid the impression, however, that by leaving North Korea out of its scope it perhaps unwittingly serves to perpetuate the dangerous concept of a divided Korea that has led to the vast tragedy that has engulfed the population of its southern half.

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Since World War II policymakers in Washington have kept Korea and Vietnam divided.

The patriotic forces of Vietnam are today moving swiftly to end the division of their country.

American friends of the divided Korean people hail this stunning development which has been brought about through the enormous sacrifices of the Vietnamese people and by the strength of the peace movement in the United States.

The American people's opposition to the policy of the U.S. government is reflected in the following statement made by Rep. Paul McCloskey (Rep.-Calif.) upon his return from a trip to Indochina.

"I can only tell you my emotional reaction, getting into that country. If I could have found the military or State Department leader who has been the architect of this policy, my instinct would be to string him up. . . . What they have done to the country is greater evil than we have done to any country in the world."